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"Do the risky things in this world. And then, when
you're looking to scale them, plug into governments. That
gives you even more impact."
-Steve Case, former CEO of America Online'
"We believe this [Social Impact Bond] investment paves
the way for a new type of instrument that enables the public
sector to leverage upfront funding from the private sector."
-Lloyd Blankfein, CEO and Chairman,
Goldman SachS2
"I want to use our G8 presidency to push this [social
investment] agenda forward. We will work with other G8
nations to grow the social investment market and increase
investment, allowing the best social innovations to spread
and help tackle our shared social and economic challenges."
-U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron3
1. The Forbes 400 Summit: Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and the Greatest Round-
table of All Time, FORREs (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
randalllane/2012/09/18/the-forbes-400-summit-bill-gates-warren-buffett-
and-the-greatest-roundtable-of-all-time/.
2. Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy
Mayor Gibbs and Corr. Comm'r Schriro Announce Nation's First Social Im-
pact Bond Program (Aug. 2, 2012) [hereinafter NYC SIB Press Release],
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f
1c701c789a0/indexjsp?pagelD=mayor-press-release&catlD=I 94&doc_
name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012b%
2Fpr285-12.html&cc=unusedl978&rc=I 194&ndi=1.
3. Kamal Ahmed, Cameron to Push G8 on Finance Bonds for New "Social
Investment," THE TEI.EGRAPH, Feb. 10, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fi-
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Governments have long used public/private partnerships
to crowd private sector resources-both financial resources
and know-how-into building large-scale infrastructure
projects.4 Think toll roads, airports, or power plants. Yet pub-
lic/private partnerships do not need to be limited to building
large, physical infrastructure projects. Public/private partner-
ships can also be used to tackle development issues like limit-
ing the spread of disease, improving educational opportunities
for the world's poor, and preventing the devastating effects
wrought by a warming global climate.5
nance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9859906/Cameron-to-push-G8-on-fi-
nance-bonds-for-new-social-i nvestment.html.
4. See generally PPP IN INFRASTRUCrURE RtsouRc, CENTER FOR CON-
TRAcrs, LAW AND REGULATION: POTENTIA. BENEFITS OF PUBI.C PRIVATE PART-
NERSHIPS [hereinafter PPPIRC], www.worldbank.org/ppp (last visited Apr.
14, 2013) (pointing out the renewed attention public/private partnerships
are receiving, particularly as fiscally-constrained governments seek to make
large infrastructure investments to promote economic growth).
5. See CTR. FOR GL.OBAL DEv. & Soc. FIN., DEVELOPMENT IMPACT BONDS
BRIEFING NOTE-MAY 2013, http://international.cgdev.org/sites/default/
files/Development%20Impact%20Bonds%20Briefing%20Note%20-%202.
pdf (anticipating the imminent release of a report on six case studies explor-
ing how development impact bonds can be used to improve development
outcomes). This broadening of the purposes to which public/private part-
nerships are applied is starting to manifest itself in national public/private
partnerships legislation, too. For example, in 2012 Kenya enacted public/
private partnerships legislation that contemplates expressly the use of pub-
lic/private partnerships for development projects as well as for more tradi-
tional, physical infrastructure projects. See The Public Private Partnerships
Act, No. 15 (2013), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 27 §1, http://www.keny-
alaw.org/kir/fileadniin/pdfdownloads/Acts/PiblicPrivatePartnerships_
ActNol5of2013.pdf ("An Act of Parliament to provide for the participation
of the private sector in the financing, construction, development, operation,
or maintenance of infrastructure or development projects of the Government
through concession or other contractual arrangements ..... (emphasis ad-
ded)). The Kenya Public Private Partnerships Act defines "public private
partnership" as:
an arrangement between a contracting authority and a private
party under which a private party-
(a) undertakes to perform a public function or provide a service
on behalf of the contracting authority;
(b) receives a benefit for performing a public function by way of-
(i) compensation from a public fund;
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
2013] 449
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
Creating successful public/private partnerships that de-
velop large-scale solutions to the world's most pressing social
problems is a growing preoccupation of many today. Billion-
aire philanthropists like Steve Case, government leaders like
U.K Prime Minister David Cameron, and investment bankers
like Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs, as well as impact-ori-
ented investors, nongovernmental social service providers, and
development assistance organizations are all interested in cre-
ating such public/private partnerships.6 This explains much of
the growing interest in a social finance innovation that is being
piloted in the United Kingdom and New York City called the
social impact bond ("SIB").
While the SIB structure is still in its infancy, there is mo-
mentum building to globalize this social finance innovation so
that it can help scale development goals around the world.7
(ii) charges or fees collected by the private party from users or
consumers of a service provided to them; or
(iii) a combination of such compensation and such charges or
fees; and
(c) is generally liable for risks arising from the performance of the
function in accordance with the terms of the project agreement
Id.
6. See, e.g., supra notes 1-3.
7. Interest in SIBs has been growing in many countries since the launch
of the first two SIBs discussed infra Part II. The U.K has been the global
trailblazer in launching SIBs. According to U.K press accounts, as of the
time of the writing of this article, there are ten SIBs underway in the U.K
Patrick Wintour, Social Impact Bond Launched to Help Teenagers in Care and the
Homeless, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2012).
One recent U.K SIB is focused on keeping troubled teenagers out of
foster care. In late November 2012 the Essex County Council launched a SIB
that raised £3.1 million to keep at least 100 troubled teenagers (from a se-
lected group of 380 teenagers) with their families and out of residential or
specialized foster care for the next 5 years. The Essex City Council will use
the proceeds of this SIB to pay for intensive family therapy for the teenagers.
If the Essex SIB is successful in keeping 100 teenagers out of the govern-
ment-funded care system and living at home with their families for 5 years, it
is estimated that the government could enjoy as much as £17 million in sav-
ings, and SIB investors could earn an annual return of 8-12%. See Rosemary
Bennett, Second Chance: Council Offers Investors a £3m Bet on Youngsters Not
Behaving Badly, THE TIMEs (Nov. 23, 2012); see also Wintour, supra.
One of the eight investors in the Essex SIB is Big Society Capital, which
committed to invest £825,000. See Essex Social Impact Bond, BIG SOCIETY CAPI-
TAL, http://www.bigsocietycapital.com/how-we-invest/essex-social-impact-
bond (last visited May 10, 2013). Big Society Capital itself is a relative new-
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Taking the SIB global is not a simple matter, however. This
article explores several of the more challenging issues that are
likely to arise in applying a SIB or elements of the SIB struc-
ture to social problems and development goals in developing
comer; it was launched in April of 2012 as a "social investment wholesaler."
See Our Story, BIG Soci.r CAPITAL, http://www.bigsocietycapital.comn/our-
story (last visited May 10, 2013). Big Society Capital raised its initial capital
from the Big Society Trust (which, in turn, was funded with dormant bank
accounts) and from four U.K. banks-Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking
Group and Royal Bank of Scotland-as part of those banks' commitment to
the "Project Merlin" agreement with the U.K. Government. See How We Are
Funded, Bic SOCIETY CAPITAL http://www.bigsocietycapital.com/how-we-are-
funded (last visited May 10, 2013); see also Project Merlin-Banks' Statement,
H.M. TREASURY, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bankagreement 0902
1I.pdf. In addition to funding Big Society Capital, under the Project Merlin
agreement banks committed to lend more money (especially to small busi-
nesses); pay less in bonuses; be more transparent about pay packages; and
make a greater contribution to regional economies and society. Id.
The Canadian government also has expressed interest in employing
SIBs as part of a larger initiative to support social finance programs. See Gov-
ernment of Canada Involvement, HUMAN RESOURCES AND SKILILS DEVEI.OPMENT
CANADA (last modified Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/consul-
tations/socialfinance/gocinvolvement.shtml.
The government of New South Wales in Australia has begun a pilot "so-
cial benefit bond" program modeled on the Peterborough SIB, see infra Part
II, that is aimed at reducing the number of children entering into foster care
and also reducing recidivism rates of youthful offenders. See Social Benefit
Bonds, N.S.W. TREASURY DEPT, http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/siteplan/
social benefit bonds (last visited Apr. 14, 2013); see also Michaela
Whitbourn, Westpac, C.B.A. Embrace Social Bonds, FIN. REv. (Mar. 21, 2012),
available at http://www.afr.com/p/national/westpaccba.embrace social
bonds-imyi01 zs3Mzr2EVCbfTJrkM.
A recent report commissioned by the European Commission urges
member states, investors, and other potential stakeholders to institute feasi-
bility tests for SIBs and other "payment for results" mechanisms across Eu-
rope. See CARMEL O'SULLIVAN ET AL., Soc. INNOVATION EUR., FINANCING So-
CIAI. IMPACT: FUNDING SOCIAL INNOVATION IN EUROPE-MAPIING THE WAY
FORWARn 49-50 (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_get
document.cfm?doc id=7048.
The Center for Global Development, working in partnership with Social
Finance, has also convened a working group of policymakers to explore the
application of the SIB structure to development goals. Co-chaired by Owen
Barder (Center for Global Development), Toby Eccles (Social Finance), and
Elizabeth Littlefield (Overseas Private Investment Corporation), this work-
ing group has coined the term "Development Impact Bonds" to describe its
focus. See Development Impact Bonds Working Group, CTR. FOR GL OISAL DEv.,
http://www.cgdev.org/section/about/cgd-europe/development-impact
bonds (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
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countries. The article begins with a summary review of the
goals and structures used in the two earliest SIBs. It then dis-
cusses key challenges and opportunities that SIBs and SIB-like
structures are likely to present to public and private stakehold-
ers. Finally, the article focuses on what is needed to take SIBs
to developing countries and discusses two modifications that
could be made to the basic SIB structure to address possible
political risks arising in a developing country context-elimi-
nating the host country as the SIB payor and/or embedding
credit enhancements into the SIB structure. It concludes with
a discussion of a possible variation on the SIB structure, a new
social finance innovation called the Social Impact Perform-
ance Guarantee ("SIP Guarantee"). The SIP Guarantee, as
contemplated here, would realign SIB risks so that private in-
vestors/guarantors assume the performance risk of the key pri-
vate actors, while public investors/lenders assume the per-
formance and financial risk of the key public actors.
II.
EARLY SIBs
A. Structures of the Early SIBs
The two earliest SIBs, launched in Peterborough, England
in 2010 and New York City in 2012, are structured as contrac-
tual arrangements that seek to align public and private stake-
holders' financial interests around the funding of multiple so-
cial service providers to prevent certain social problems. This
focus on funding social services that are expected to prevent,
rather than remedy, a problem is a hallmark of both of the
early SIB structures.8
While SIBs can be structured in different ways, one basic
SIB structure, as used in the Peterborough SIB, includes the
following actors:
1. a government contracting authority that is willing to
engage in a pay-for-success contract under which it will
pay fees upon receiving evidence of measurable im-
provements in preventing a defined social problem;
8. As Nick Hurd, Minister for Civil Society, U.K. recently noted, "Social
[i]mpact [b]onds are opening up serious resources to tackle social problems
in new and innovative ways. It is particularly good in the areas of prevention
and early intervention, which are difficult to fund across government depart-
ments." Wintour, supra note 7.
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2. social service providers that can demonstrate credible
success in tackling the social problem that is to be the
focus of the SIB;
3. private investor(s) that are willing to put at risk not
only potential financial returns but also some or all of
the principal amount of their investment if the target
goals of the pay-for-success contract are not achieved;
4. an intermediary that: (i) borrows money from the pri-
vate investor(s), (ii) distributes the SIB loan proceeds
to the social service providers for use in expanding
their services, and then (iii) over the life of the SIB
arrangement, monitors and provides general oversight
with respect to the SIB's overall performance and di-
rects the flow of funds among the social service provid-
ers, SIB investors, and contracting government author-
ity; and
5. an independent evaluator" that determines whether
the target outcomes have been achieved in accordance
with the government's pay-for-success contract.
Exhibit A diagrams the basic structure of the Peterbor-
ough SIB.'
9. Some commenters suggest that there are two distinct evaluator roles
to be included in a SIB structure: 1) an evaluation advisor that helps define
performance targets, designs assessment approach, monitors progress dur-
ing life of SIB and analyzes interim assessment results as part of a SIB man-
agement team so as to help guide corrective action when/if necessary; and
2) an independent assessor that works on an arm's length basis from all of
the other SIB parties, and reports on whether SIB targeted outcomes have
been met. See McKINSEY & Co., FROM POTENTIAL TO AcrION: BRINGING So-
CIAL, IMPACT BONDS TO THE U.S. 41 (2012), https://mckinseyonsociety.com/
downloads/reports/Social-Innovation/McKinseySocialImpactBondsRe
port.pdf.
10. See Exhibit A for how the Peterborough SIB structure allocates risk
and return. See also Soc. FIN., A Nmew Tool FOR ScAuNG IMPAcr: How SOCiAL.
IMPAc-r BONDS CAN MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL. To ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 12,
16-17 (2012) [hereinafter A NEW TooL], http://www.socialfinancetus.org/
sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFinanceWPSingleFINAL_0.pdf
(describing basic SIB mechanics and actors).
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SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS OUTCOME PAYORS
(e.g., nonfrofit, I&rorps, fiorofits) (e.g., government, founidations,
DELIVE ACHIEVE
POPUIATIONS IN NEED OUTCOMES INDEPENDENT VALIDATORS
(e.g., homeless, Jormeri incarcraed, (e.g., evdauaion firm, academir5,
al-risk youth, aging enios consultants)
In the Peterborough SIB, the social objective is to reduce
prisoner recidivism in Her Majesty's Prison Peterborough in
the United Kingdom." Seventeen philanthropists and other
investors provided £5 million (around $8 million) of upfront
capital in the form of debt finance to Social Finance, a not-for-
profit organization that is acting as this SIB's intermediary.' 2
Social Finance in turn provided the proceeds of these loans as
11. The stated aim of the Peterborough SIB is to provide "intensive sup-
port to prisoners and their families, both inside prison and after release, to
help them resettle into the community." Press Release, Soc. Fin., Overview of
the Peterborough Social Impact Bond (2011) [hereinafter Peterborough
SIB Overview], available at http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfin
anceus.org/files/SF_.PeterboroughSIB_0.pdf.
12. Most of the seventeen Peterborough SIB investors are charities or
foundations, such as Barrow Cadbury Trust, Esmee Fairbairn Foundation,
Friends Provident Foundation, The Henry Smith Charity, Johansson Family
Foundation, LankellyChase Foundation, The Monument Trust, Panahpur,
Paul Hamlyn Foundation and Tudor Trust. EMMA DISLEY ET AL., LESSONS
LEARNE) FROM THE PLANNING ANi) EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOCIAL IM-
PACT BOND AT H.M.P. PETERBOROUGH 23 (2011), http://www.rand.org/con-
tent/dam/rand/pubs/technical-reports/2011/RANDTRI166.pdf. Several
"high net worth" individuals also invested in the Peterborough SIB. Id. at n.
41. Some of the Peterborough SIB investors had not previously invested in
criminal justice programs-so, at least in this particular Peterborough SIB,
the SIB structure catalyzed new investors to invest in the area of criminal
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working capital to One Service, a not-for-profit organization
set up in 2010 by Social Finance to provide a comprehensive
reentry program for prisoners.' 3 If the social services interven-
tions succeed in meeting specified performance outcomes-
significant reductions in the current prisoner recidivism
rate' 4-as assessed by an independent party, the government
will pay a return that includes the principal amount invested
by the SIB investors together with a capped, sliding success
fee.' 5 The amount of this sliding success fee will depend on
the extent to which the performance outcome targets are
achieved.' 6 If the performance outcome targets are not met,
however, the government will have no payment obligations
and, consequently, the SIB investors will lose their entire in-
vestment.' 7
justice and offender rehabilitation. Id. at x. Whether other SIBs also can
attract investors to invest in a new issue area remains to be seen. See id at 50.
13. See generally About ONE, ONE SERVICE, www.onesib.org (last visited
Apr. 7, 2013). Funding from the Peterborough SIB is directed through the
One Service program, which in turn has contracted with a group of exper-
ienced social service providers that includes St. Giles Trust (which provides
support to offenders in the host prison, at the prison gates, and in the com-
munity), Ormiston Trust (which provides support to prisoners' families
while the offenders are in prison and after release), an organization called
Supporting Others through Volunteer Action, and the YMCA (which pro-
vides a community base of support), as well as other social service providers
that may be identified for additional funding in the future. Peterborough
SIB Overview, supra note 11.
14. Sixty percent of short-sentence prisoners (i.e., those sentenced to
one year or less in prison) in the U.K. re-offend within one year of release
from incarceration. Peterborough SIB Overview, supra note 11.
15. The Peterborough SIB has an eight-year term with payments to SIB
investors, if due, occurring approximately in years four, six, and eight. A
NEw Toot., supra note 10, at 9.
16. Id. For a further discussion of performance measurements, see infra
notes 17-21.
17. The Peterborough SIB investors will be paid only if there is a measur-
able reduction of at least 7.5% in the frequency of reconviction events for
3,000 male prisoners sentenced to one year or less as compared to a control
group of other short-sentence prisoners in the U.K. See Peterborough SIB
Overview, supra note 11. The frequency of reconviction events will be mea-
sured across all short-sentence offenders released from incarceration in Pe-
terborough, not just those who enjoy SIB-funded social services. DISILE ET
AL., supra note 12 at 35. The frequency of reconviction events is being used
as a proxy measure. While this measure is likely to underestimate the actual
number of re-offenses, it is expected to have a close correlation to the costs
incurred by the criminal justice system as a result of re-offenses. See id. at 33,
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Measuring the achievement of SIB performance targets
for purposes of determining the amount of the SIB success fee
can be challenging. In the Peterborough SIB, for example, the
relatively small number of prisoners involved poses a risk of
statistical sampling error in measuring performance out-
comes.' 8 As a result, it is expected to take three to four years
from the date of the initial SIB investment before any pay-
ments will be made to SIB investors.' 9 This is because it will
take time to demonstrate the statistical validity of the targeted
performance outcomes for the Peterborough SIBs. In future
SIBs, where there are bigger sample sizes to measure, it should
be easier and faster to demonstrate the statistical validity of
performance targets. 20 If improved outcomes can be demon-
strated and measured earlier, then SIB outcome payments can
be made sooner. 21 Moreover, if SIB outcome payments can be
n. 58. Note that the Peterborough SIB measures the "frequency" of reconvic-
tion, not the more binary calculation of whether any reconviction takes
place. See id. at xi, 33-38.
18. The relatively small number of prisoners involved in the Peterbor-
ough SIB poses several significant challenges, the first of which is a sample
size issue. Having such a small sample of data points means that there is a
risk of creating false positives through sampling error. The Peterborough
SIB essentially places this risk of sampling error on the SIB investors rather
than on the host government, thereby reducing the risk that the Ministry of
Justice would pay for an outcome that may not have been caused by the SIB
intervention. See id. at 37. As a result, if there is less than conclusive evidence
of the targeted performance outcomes of the Peterborough SIB (defined
here as less than a 10% reduction in reconviction rates for each cohort of
approximately 1,000 offenders being measured, or less than a 7.5% reduc-
tion in reconviction rates across all 3,000 offenders as compared to other
short sentence prisoners in the U.K.), the Peterborough SIB investors will
lose all of their SIB investments. Id. at 33-34. On the other hand, if there is a
reduction of at least 10% per cohort or 7.5% overall in these reconviction
rates, then the Peterborough SIB investors will receive a fixed sum per re-
duced reconviction event. Id. at 3. The overall value of the outcome pay-
ments is expected to generate an annual internal rate of return of between
7.5% and 13% depending on the scale of reduction in reconviction events
and subject to a cap imposed by the Ministry ofJustice on the total amount
of outcome payments. Id. at 40.
19. Id. at 37.
20. Id. at 41.
21. The first outcome payments, provided the reduced reconviction rate
threshold is met, are expected to take place three to four years after the
initial SIB investments. Social Finance representatives have noted that they
think that three to four years may be the maximum length that SIB investors
would be willing to wait for outcome payments, particularly given the illi-
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made sooner, it may be possible to enlarge the circle of poten-
tial SIB investors as there is likely a limited number of investors
who are willing to offer such patient capital.22
As noted previously, the social service providers funded
with proceeds of the Peterborough SIB have proven track
records of success in delivering their respective contracted so-
cial service interventions.2 3 By limiting the Peterborough SIB
funding to proven social service providers and interventions,
the execution risk being shouldered by SIB investors is prima-
rily that of whether the contracted social services aimed at re-
ducing prisoner recidivism can be scaled, rather than the exe-
cution risk of whether these particular social service providers
can reduce prisoner recidivism. That is not to say that scaling a
proven social service provider and its programs is risk-free.
Many a provider of services has stumbled when trying to grow
small-scale success into something larger.24
Like the Peterborough SIB, the New York City SIB is
aimed at reducing prisoner recidivism and does so by provid-
ing funding to scale preventive social interventions. 25 The in-
termediary in the New York City SIB is the MDRC, a non-profit
organization that has entered into a pay-for-success contract
with the City of New York's Department of Corrections.2" The
proceeds of this SIB arrangement are being used to fund the
implementation of a program called the Adolescent Behav-
ioral Learning Experience ("ABLE").27 Like the Peterborough
quidity of SIB investments. Disi.EY AT AL., supra note 12, at 38-41. Other re-
searchers have suggested that the maximum investment horizon of a SIB is
four to six years. See id.; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 9, at 51.
22. See generally Disi.Ey ET AL.., supra note 12, at 38, 43.
23. See supra note 13; Peterborough SIB Overview, supra note 11.
24. See infra note 57 (discussing challenges of scaling microfinance).
25. New York City announced the first SIB in the United States on Au-
gust 2, 2012. NYC SIB Press Release, supra note 2. Nicknamed "Rikers
Bonds" after the Rikers Island Correctional Facility, the New York City SIB
focuses on the 50% re-incarceration rate of youthful offenders in New York
City. Id.
26. Id.
27. Two non-profit groups, the Osborne Association and Friends of the
Island Academy, have been contracted to provide interventions in the form
of education, intensive training, and counseling to the adolescent offenders
that are the target of this SIB. NYC SIB Press Release, supra note 2. The Vera
Institute ofJustice has been contracted to act as the independent evaluator
to assess the re-incarceration rates and overall effectiveness of the ABLE pro-
gram. Id.
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SIB, this SIB also has a performance hurdle that must be met
before any SIB payments are required to be made by the gov-
ernment contracting authority. Namely, the re-incarceration
rate of youthful offenders at the Rikers Correctional Facility
must be reduced by at least ten percent from its historical
rate.28
The New York City SIB is structured differently from the
Peterborough SIB, however, in several important ways. Unlike
the Peterborough SIB, there is only one SIB investor in the
New York City SIB: Goldman Sachs Bank.29 The MDRC is bor-
rowing $9.6 million from Goldman Sachs in the form of a mul-
tiple-disbursing loan that is to be repaid at the end of the fifth
year if the overall performance targets are met. 0 The New
York City SIB is also unlike the Peterborough SIB to the extent
that it enjoys a credit enhancement in the form of a partial
guarantee being provided by Bloomberg Philanthropies. This
guarantee is being given in the form of a grant of $7.2 million
from Bloomberg Philanthropies to the MDRC to be held in a
guarantee fund to backstop the Goldman Sachs loan.3 ' As a
result, Goldman Sachs enjoys the potential upside return of
success fees, yet Goldman Sachs is also protected, in significant
28. The outcome payments to be made by the City of New York's Depart-
ment of Corrections are structured on a capped sliding scale based on how
much re-incarceration rates are reduced from historical rates at the Rikers
Correctional Facility. Id. The re-incarceration rate of youthful offenders
(aged 16-18) must drop by at least 10% of the historical rate before any
payment obligation is triggered under this SIB. If the re-incarceration rate
for youthful offenders at Rikers Correctional Facility drops by more than
10%, then the City of New York's Department of Corrections will pay addi-
tional success fees up to a capped limit. Id.
29. Goldman Sachs expects to receive Community Reinvestment Act
credit from its bank regulator for its investment in this New York City SIB. See
STEVEN GODEKE & LYEL RESNER, GODEKE CONSULTING, BUILDING A HEALTHY
AND SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND MARKET: THE INVESTOR LANDSCAPE 22
(2012), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.confluencephilanthropy.org/re
source/collection/6E9822F7-5F6B-4B6A-BA82-3737DF0BC826/Godeke
Consulting-SocialImpact Bond Investor Landscape.pdf.
30. This staggered, conditional disbursement schedule should also help
to protect the SIB investment being made by Goldman Sachs since it permits
Goldman Sachs to stop making loan disbursements if interim targets are un-
met. Id. (explaining that the Goldman Sachs loan is to be disbursed over
four years on a quarterly basis, subject to the achievement of specified im-
pact targets).
31. NYC SIB Press Release, supra note 2.
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part, from downside risk by the credit guarantee provided by
Bloomberg Philanthropiesi3 Should the New York City SIB
performance targets be missed, the MDRC is not required to
pay anything to Goldman Sachs beyond the guarantee funds
provided by Bloomberg Philanthropies5 3 On the other hand,
if there are any guarantee funds remaining after this first New
York City SIB, the MDRC can retain those funds to support
future SIBs. 34 This opportunity to roll the Bloomberg Philan-
thropies guarantee from one successful SIB to another pro-
vides an incentive for the MDRC to ensure that the SIB's per-
formance targets are met so that the MDRC can use these
guarantee funds to support future SIB transactions.35
Notice that it is quite a stretch to call either of these early
SIBs "bonds."3 6 Rather, the two earliest SIBs have more in
common with bridge finance as the loans being made by the
SIB investors are intended to "bridge" the gap between 1) the
near-term, working capital needs of a group of social service
providers that have been chosen to provide designated social
services pursuant to a government pay-for-success contract and
2) the longer-term government payments to be made, if any,
on that pay-for-success contract. Notice, also, that these two
SIBs offer their investors the least attractive features of both
debt and equity. They have all the upside of debt (relatively
low, capped returns) and all the downside of equity (relatively
32. If the re-incarceration rate drops by more than 20% of the historical
level, Goldman Sachs will receive a return of $2.1 million. Alternatively, if
the recidivism rate does not drop by at least 10% from the historical level,
then Goldman Sachs could lose up to $2.4 million (after taking into account
guarantee payments of $7.2 million). Chris Francescani, New York Tests Social
Impact Bond Investing with Goldman Sachs, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE87111420120802; see also
GODEKE & RESNER, supra note 29, at 22.
33. NYC SIB Press Release, supra note 2.
34. GODEKE & RESNER, supra note 29, at 22. See also discussion infra notes
88-98 and accompanying text of how rolling guarantees might be tapped for
greater use in SIB transactions.
35. GoDEKE & RESNER, supra note 29, at 22.
36. See generally MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 9, at 13; GODEK & RESNER,
supra note 29, at 5 (arguing that the term "social impact bond" is a misno-
mer for early SIBs, which do not share typical bond features such as sched-
uled principal payments, designated interest rates (or coupons), and ease of
transfer in secondary market); see also A NEw TooL, supra note 10, at 14
(explaining how SIBs differ from municipal bonds and other fixed-income
instruments used for infrastructure projects).
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high risks of nonpayment).3 Not exactly the traditional pair-
ing of risk and return that most investors seek. Yet SIBs are
generating a growing amount of excitement and attention.38
37. See id. (explaining that SIBs share features of both debt and equity-
like debt, they offer fixed terms and capped upside, but, like equity, returns
vary according to performance-so that, compared to more typical debt in-
struments, SIB investors bear greater risk of losing all of their investment).
38. See supra note 7. In the United States growing interest in SIBs is being
generated at the state and city levels of government since that is where most
social services are contracted and delivered. Several states in the United
States are moving forward with SIB transactions. The State of Massachusetts
is developing SIB structures to address chronic homelessness and juvenile
justice. See Press Release, Exec. Office for Admin. & Fin., Commonwealth of
Mass., Massachusetts First State in Nation To Pursue "Pay for Success" Social
Innovation Contracts (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.nass.gov/anf/press-re-
leases/2012/ma-first-to-pursue-pay-for-success-contracts.html; see also An Act
Establishing the Social Innovation Financing Trust Fund and Authorizing
the Lease of the Henderson Boat House, MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 10, § 35W
(2012), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/
2012/Chapterl43.
On March 21, 2013 the NewJersey Assembly passed legislation to establish a
SIB pilot program and study commission within the New Jersey Economic
Development Authority. The New Jersey Social Innovation Act, Assemb.
A3289, 215th Leg., 1st Annual Sess. (N.J. 2013) [hereinafter N.J. Social Inno-
vation Act] (received in the Senate as S2710 on Apr. 15, 2013 and referred
to the Senate Economic Growth Committee), available at http://www.
njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/A3500/3289_II.htm; see also Press Release, Fifth
Legislative District, Fuentes Social Innovation Act Advanced by Assembly
(March 21, 2013), available at http://www.politickernj.com/63023/fuentes-
social-innovation-bill-advanced-assembly-panel ("[The N.J.] Social Innova-
tion Act" establishes a five-year SIB pilot program with a focus on "attracting
private funding for public programs aimed at reducing the cost of providing
health care to low-income and uninsured residents" of New Jersey); Social
Impact Bonds Could Motivate Private Companies To Invest In Public Programs, N.J.
TODAY (Dec. 6, 2012), http://njtoday.net/2012/12/06/social-impact-bonds-
could-motivate-private-companies-to-invest-in-public-programs/#ixzz2Gx8G9
nsl. The U.S. federal government is also taking an interest in SIBs and other
pay-for-success initiatives. The proposed 2014 federal budget includes "$300
million incentive fund at the Department of the Treasury to help State and
local governments implement Pay for Success programs with philanthropies.
The fund will provide credit enhancements for philanthropic investments
and outcome payments for money-saving services." See OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014 53
(Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2014-
BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2014-BUD.pdf. The Department of Labor's Employ-
ment and Training Administration issued a pay-for-success solicitation with
an application deadline of January 4, 2013. Pay for Success Solicitation, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR EMP'T & TRAINING ADMIN., http://www.doleta.gov/work
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B. Interest in the Early SIBs
Why are SIBs creating such a buzz? Part of the answer is
that SIBs represent a new way to harness private capital to sup-
port the scaling of government contracted social service inter-
ventions. By tapping private sources of capital for the upfront
funding needs of scaling social service providers, SIBs also in-
troduce market accountability and oversight into the perform-
ance measurements applied to government contracts. Another
reason for the excitement generated by SIBs is that these fi-
nancial arrangements present a starkly different value proposi-
tion from the financial and social return tradeoffs that can ac-
company other forms of investments "intended to create posi-
tive impact beyond financial return"-also called "impact
investments." 9 Instead of creating impact investment opportu-
forceinnovation/success.cfm (the pay-for-success model "helps govern-
ments target limited dollars to achieve a positive, measurable outcome" and
"shifts the burden of investment risk from the government to private inves-
tors, effectively creating a social investment market where the government
only pays for results."). Approximately $20 million in grants will be awarded,
funded out of the Workforce Innovation Fund in the Department of Labor
Appropriations Act 2012. Id. ("Grants ... will fund pilots of a Pay for Success
model to demonstrate the viability of this innovative funding strategy as a
tool for state, local and tribal agencies to achieve specific workforce develop-
ment outcomes.").
39. While the definition of impact investment is not without controversy,
this definition is often cited. SeeJ.P. MORGAN GLOHAI. RESEARCH & THE ROCK-
EFEILER FOUND., IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLAss 14 (Nov.
29, 2010), available at http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/
2b053b2b-8feb-46ea-adbd-f89068d59785-impact.pdf.
The amount of capital being invested in impact investments is growing.
The aggregate amount of impact investments made in 2012 reached $8 bil-
lion in value, nearly doubling that made in 2011, according to a recent sur-
vey conducted by Social Finance and The Global Investment Impact Net-
work. See YASEMIN SALTUK ET Al.., PERsPEclivEs ON PROGRESS: THE IMPACT IN-
VESTOR SURVEY 4 (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.thegiin.org/cgi-bin/iowa/down
load?row=489&field=gated-download_1; E.T. JACKSON & ASSOCIATEs LTD.,
ACCELERATING IMPACT: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALI.ENGES AND WHAT'S NEXT IN
BuIING TI-IF IMPACT INVESTING INDUSTRY Xiii (2012), http://www.rockefel
lerfoundation.org/iploads/images/fda23ba9-ab7e-4c83-9218-24fdd79289
cc.pdf (indicating that approximately 2,200 impact investments worth $4.4
billion were made in 2011).
Impact investors exhibit a wide range of return expectations. Some im-
pact investors are unabashedly "impact first;" that is, they are willing (and in
some instances even expect) to sacrifice financial returns for social impact.
Others are "finance first" and believe that financial returns need not (and
should not) be sacrificed when social impact is being delivered. Indeed, ac-
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nities that ask investors to trade lower financial returns for
higher social returns or, alternatively, to trade lower social re-
turns for higher financial returns, SIBs not only correlate fi-
nancial and social returns, but they make financial returns de-
pendent on the amount of social returns being generated by the
investment. Thus, the more successful a SIB is in achieving its
targeted social performance outcomes, the more financial re-
turns are generated for SIB investors.
Another part of the answer is that SIBs can provide a com-
pelling focal point for spurring coordination among a broad
range of stakeholders (governments, donors, private sector in-
vestors, and non-governmental social service providers) that
are interested in scaling social service prevention interventions
for a sustained period of time. In this regard, SIBs are particu-
larly well suited to tackling those social problems that require
multiple forms of intervention by a variety of social service
providers because SIB structures lend themselves well to di-
recting significant flows of funds to a group of social service
providers (rather than just one-off investments in a particular
provider). SIBs can also be a means of focusing sustained at-
tention on a social problem, because the SIB structure re-
quires a relatively long-term funding stream, rather than a se-
ries of short-term contracts. The SIB linkage of financial re-
turns to outcome-based measurements can also help
governments grow the amount of private resources available to
pay for high-quality social service interventions while reducing
the amount of public resources spent on poorly performing
social service interventions. 40 As one commentator succinctly
cording to the 2012 Impact Investor Survey cited above, nearly two-thirds of
the 99 impact investors surveyed are targeting market financial returns for
their impact investments. See YASEMIN SALTUK FT AL., supra, at 13. See also
MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 9, at 39 (commenting on the likely sequencing
of impact investors' involvement in SIBS, where "impact first" investors are
likely to be in early-stage SIBS, while "finance first" impact investors follow
later).
40. This goal is not without controversy, however. Some critics see SIBs as
a means to privatize social objectives. They worry that governments may use
SIB structures to avoid paying for needed social programs. Les Whittington,
Feds Introduce Controversial "Social Impact Bonds" to Fund Social Services, THE
STAR (Toronto), Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/20
12/11/08/feds-introduce-controversial-social-impact bonds to fundso-
cial services.html ("critics say the bonds privatize social objectives in a way
that gets governments and the public off the hook for paying for needed
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(but perhaps overly optimistically) notes, "SIBs signify a new
paradigm of public-private partnerships in the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis, one that privatizes the risks and shares the
gains."4 ' Additionally, SIBs can help governments capture fi-
nancial savings by investing in preventive social service interven-
tions rather than incurring the future costs of more expensive
remedial programs.4 2
In sum, the SIB is a new form of public/private financial
partnership that, if structured properly, has the potential to
align the financial interests of multiple private and public
stakeholders so as to:
1. Encourage private sector investors to provide long-
term risk capital investments in social services pro-
grams/interventions that have a proven (or nearly
proven) capacity to reach sizeable scale;
2. Apply market discipline and accountability to pay-for-
success government contracting and/or development
assistance by aligning incentives for funding and repay-
ment around the achievement of specified social ser-
vice outcomes; and
3. Provide a funding mechanism for delivering sizeable
amounts of upfront, working capital in a coordinated
and sustained manner to multiple, complementary so-
cial service providers so that the performance out-
comes of their collective interventions can be har-
nessed and scaled more efficiently and effectively. 43
programs."). Other critics, like David Macdonald, a senior economist at the
Ottawa-based Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, go even farther and
argue that SIBs represent "a commercialization of social values." Id.
41. A New TooL, supra note 10, at 22.
42. It is unclear how important it is to governments that they actually
realize these savings. It is likely that governments will have a range of motiva-
tions for participating in social impact bonds, and very possibly competing
expectations and motivations may lodge within the same government. Some
government officials are likely to participate in SIBs only if quantifiable fi-
nancial savings can be captured as a result of the social service being pro-
vided at a larger scale. Others, however, may embrace SIBs based on the
scale of social impact being delivered. Still others may expect both to oc-
cur-sizeable savings to be realized, and sizeable social impacts to occur.
43. Social service providers could try to raise this working capital on their
own, of course. The challenges associated with this approach are two-fold.
First, as some of these social service providers are likely organized as not-for-
profit organizations, there are often constraints on the amount of capital
(debt and/or grants) that they can raise in order to scale significantly. (Note
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
4632013]
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
C. Differences Between the Early SIBs and Traditional
Performance-Based Government Contracting
What makes a SIB arrangement different from traditional
performance-based government contracts? First, in a perform-
ance-based government contract, payments are typically trig-
gered by the creation of designated performance "outputs"
rather than the achievement of designated performance "out-
comes." 44 So, for example, one performance "output" of a SIB
that is focused on prisoner recidivism could be an increase in
the number of prisoners receiving training in marketable
trade skills to improve employment opportunities upon their
release from incarceration, whereas one performance "out-
come" would be a reduction in the rate of reconvictions taking
place among the targeted prisoner population.
Second, even where the government contract is struc-
tured as a "pay-for-success" contract, so that it pays upon the
successful achievement of performance outcomes rather than
outputs, the financial risks generally are allocated between just
two parties-the host government and its contractors. 4 5 By
that McKinsey researchers assumed that not-for-profit organizations would
be the leading providers of preventive interventions for homelessness and
prisoner recidivism. See McKINSEY & Co., supra note 9, at 19.) Second, for
thorny social problems like recidivism and.homelessness, it is unlikely that
one social service provider can deliver all the program interventions that are
needed to reach a successful outcome. This creates need for a "collective
action" response mechanism whereby a number of social service providers
can scale their activities collectively. Coordinating this kind of funding on a
provider-by-provider basis is likely to be very difficult. Hence, there is a need
for a funding mechanism like the SIB that generates capital that can then be
delivered to multiple social service providers.
44. Some commenters are careful to distinguish between "pay-for-per-
formance" and "pay-for-success" contracts. See GoDEKE & RESNER, supra note
29, at 5 (explaining that pay-for-performance contracts pay for achievement
of performance outputs, in contrast to pay-for-success contracts, which pay
for performance outcomes); see also A NEW Tool-, supra note 10, at 13 (ex-
plaining that SIBs differ substantially from government performance-based
contracts for social services).
45. How that financial risk is allocated between the parties turns on
which party provides the upfront working capital. In some cases, pay-for-suc-
cess contracts impose most of the financial risk on the contractors, which
must secure upfront working capital from investors or other sources to fulfill
the contract. Government payments then take place only after specified per-
formance goals are achieved. In other cases, the government bears most of
the financial risk by contracting to make a fixed payment to the contractor,
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pairing a pay-for-success government contract with a SIB fund-
ing structure, private investors and not the host government
become the source of the social service providers' upfront,
working capital. Therefore, the SIB investors bear the financial
risk of the social service providers' underperformance.
Third, by attracting longer-term financing from private
SIB investors, there is also an opportunity, depending on the
SIB investors' appetite, to extend the period over which pay-
for-success transactions are to be conducted and funded.
Whereas traditional government sources of funding provide
relatively short-term funds (for one to two years) to pay for
social services, SIBs can therefore be structured to match fund-
ing maturities with much longer performance horizons.46
Integrating SIB investors into a pay-for-success govern-
ment contract has more implications than just financial risk
allocation and funding maturities, however. In order to give
SIB investors sufficient assurance that their investments will be
protected, SIB structures can give investors, or (more likely)
intermediaries acting on behalf of the investors' interests, a
much greater role in taking actions and making decisions
about matters that are more typically within the purview of the
contracting host government. For example, whereas tradi-
tional government contracts typically articulate the amount of
funds to be expended, the type of services to be delivered, and
the delivery methods to be used, SIBs can be structured so as
to give private sector players more latitude to decide which ser-
vices are to be delivered and which methods are to be used to
achieve targeted levels of performance outcomes. Similarly,
government procurement processes typically give government
officials the ultimate decision-making authority regarding
which social service providers to fund and whether to replace
underperforming social service providers. SIBs, however, may
delegate much of this authority to private sector players, such
as the SIB intermediary, who have a financial or, at the very
and then "tops up" that payment with success fees if certain specified per-
formance goals are met. See generally A New Toot, supra note 10, at 13.
46. There is likely to be a limit, however, to how patient SIB investors will
be. Requiring SIB investors to wait three to four years from the date of their
initial SIB investment for an outcome payment (as they must in the Peter-
borough SIB) may limit the types of investors that will be attracted to SIBs.
See discussion at supra note 21.
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
2013]1 465
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
least, reputational interest in seeing that the performance out-
comes are achieved.4 7
Sharing or explicitly delegating decision-making authority
from the contracting government authority to private actors
can be a challenging hurdle to the successful integration of a
SIB funding structure into a pay-for-success government con-
tract. This hurdle can take many forms-from culture to statu-
tory impediments. 48 Accordingly, there is a growing need for
knowledge sharing and transparency about the effectiveness of
the SIB governance models and contractual arrangements that
are being developed to address this delegation of contracting
47. See DISLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 16. The Peterborough SIB marked
the development of a new type of commissioning relationship. In other pay-
for-success contracts undertaken in the United Kingdom, the government
typically maintains some control over the selection of social service provid-
ers. Id. at x. In the Peterborough SIB, however, provider selection was dele-
gated to the intermediary, Social Finance, and the government has no direct
contractual relationship with the service providers. See id. at 11-12.
48. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Legislative Guide on Privately
Financed Infrastructure Projects 147-48 (2001) [hereinafter UNCITRAL
LEGISlATIVE GUIDE], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
procurem/pfip/guide/pfip-e.pdf; see also Civil Law Systems-Key Terms Im-
plied by Law that Can Impact PPP Arrangements: Rights of Contracting Authority
that May Ovenide Contractual Provisions, PPP INFRASTRUcTURE RES. CTR.,
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/ppp-overview/practi-
cal-tools/checklists-and-risk-matrices/civil-law-systems-key-terms/civil-law-syst
(last visited Feb. 25 2013) (indicating that many civil law countries have en-
acted administrative laws to govern public/private partnerships that may
give contracting government authority rights to override public/private con-
tractual arrangements, such as to modify or cancel such contracts unilater-
ally (if deemed in public interest) and rights to require continuity of service
(even if the contracting government authority breaches its contractual obli-
gations)).
In some countries, continuity of certain social services is deemed so im-
portant that service providers are required by law to ensure the continuous
provision of service. Moreover, in legal systems where this statutory duty ex-
ists, it is not unusual also to find that, while general principles of contract
law might authorize a party to suspend/discontinue performance of its obli-
gations, perhaps due to economic hardship or material counterparty
breaches, concessionaires cannot invoke those contract principles as
grounds for suspending or discontinuing the provision of public services. See
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GuImE, supra, at 129 ("In some legal systems, the
contracting authority may even have special enforcement powers to compel
the concessionaire to resume providing the service in the event of an unlaw-
ful discontinuance.").
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authority from host governments to SIB investors or SIB in-
termediaries.
III.
GROWING THE SIB EcosYsrM: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
At this early stage in the evolution of the SIB, the end
game of this new type of public/private partnership structure
is hard to pin down. As each new SIB is transacted, there are
likely to be refinements made in the SIB structure to reflect
the needs of all stakeholders involved-governments, social
service providers, SIB intermediaries, and SIB investors-and
to reflect local circumstances and relationships. The likeli-
hood of refinements reinforces the need for those participat-
ing in early SIB arrangements to engage in what at least one
commenter has termed "high value learning,"*4 so that the les-
sons of both successful and unsuccessful SIB structures can be
shared broadly and quickly. In the interim, while we wait to see
how well these first SIBs work, it is worth surveying the chal-
lenges that have confronted more traditional public/private
partnerships to glean lessons that could be applied to SIBs.
As noted above, SIB structures have much in common
with private, infrastructure project financings as these two
funding structures create opportunities to reduce the commit-
ment of public funds and resources, while increasing private
sector funding. Like privately financed infrastructure projects,
SIBs make it possible to transfer to the private sector a number
of risks that otherwise would be borne by the host govern-
ment. Accordingly, appropriate risk allocation is just as essen-
tial in SIB arrangements as it is in more traditional, privately
financed infrastructure projects.
SIB risks can come in many flavors. One commenter has
grouped these risks under the following categories: "interven-
tion model, execution, intermediary, political, financial, and
reputational risks."5" The allocation of these risks among the
various parties to SIB arrangements is likely to be shaped by
49. JEFREY B. LIEBMAN, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDs: A PROMISING NEW FINANC-
INC. MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL. INNOVATION AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE 20 (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/social-impacthbonds.pdf.
50. See A NEw Toot., supra note 10, at 20-22.
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factors such as the public interest in scaling the social sector
services in question, the level of risk faced by the private play-
ers, and the extent of the private players' ability (and readi-
ness) to absorb those risks at an acceptable cost. Relatedly, as
in infrastructure projects, inappropriate allocations of project
risks can compromise the SIB's financial viability and efficient
management. So, just as in privately financed infrastructure
projects, every discussion of adopting a SIB structure should
be accompanied by 1) a hard-headed assessment of the poten-
tial severity of the risks involved should a SIB arrangement go-
ing awry and 2) a transfer of those risks to the party or parties
in the best position to manage or mitigate them. The catego-
ries of risk named above are considered in turn.
A. Intervention Model Risk
Intervention model risk refers to the risk that the chosen
social service interventions do not produce the expected out-
comes. 5 ' Limiting SIB funding to proven, as opposed to prom-
ising, social service interventions is one important way to ad-
dress this risk.52 Moreover, not every social service interven-
tion, even if proven, can (or should) be scaled through a SIB
funding structure. Perhaps most obvious, some important so-
cial services do not have outcomes that are easily measured.
For example, a SIB funding structure is not likely to be appro-
priate for social service interventions that reach such a small
number of people that it is impossible to measure with any
statistical certainty the impact of the SIB on that target popula-
tion. Nor is a SIB a good funding source if the social service
providers likely to receive the SIB funding are not able or
ready to grow to scale without damaging the quality of the ser-
vices being offered. Over time, however, as more SIB transac-
tions take place, a clearer understanding should emerge of the
types of social service interventions that are best suited to SIB
structures.5 3
51. Id. at 20.
52. See McKINSEY & CO., supra note 9, at 19 (explaining that SIBs are for
scaling proven interventions, and SIBs used for scaling promising but not
proven interventions carry both execution risk and model risk).
53. See id. at 25 (maintaining that SIB-funded interventions must focus
on prevention, have a multi-year track record (at least five years), have
demonstrated a record of vigorous evaluations, deliver statistically significant
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B. Execution Risk
Execution risk is closely related to intervention model risk
because it encompasses the performance challenges that are
unique to the SIB structure and goals as well as the perform-
ance challenges that one often encounters in project financ-
ing.54 The most obvious execution risk in a SIB structure is
that posed by the social service providers. Although a particu-
lar social service intervention may have been well chosen, the
social service providers responsible for scaling that interven-
tion may prove to be weak or otherwise unable to scale the
intervention as expected.
Conducting adequate due diligence with respect to the so-
cial service providers that are to receive SIB funding is one way
to manage this form of execution risk.55 At a minimum, this
means paying attention to whether the social service providers
to be funded by a SIB have a proven track record of success in
delivering the targeted social service interventions and of
working effectively with other social service providers. It also
means assessing whether the social service providers have the
capacity (leadership talent, staff, governance, management in-
formation systems, quality controls, back-office systems, etc.)
to grow to scale without sacrificing the quality of their services.
Even the best due diligence, however, has its limitations
when it comes to predicting how well social service providers
can absorb and put to good use the relatively large amounts of
working capital that a SIB structure is intended to generate.
Accordingly, another way to manage this form of execution
risk is to develop a robust ecosystem of support for social ser-
vice providers that are likely to become beneficiaries of SIB
funding. Building "investment ready" social service providers is
important not only for the success of SIB structures, of course,
but also for any concerted effort to bring social services to
greater scale.
A second SIB execution risk is the risk that a well-con-
ceived but badly executed SIB could wreak havoc on the very
populations that the SIB is meant to serve. For example, the
private sector players that are funding, contracting, and/or
results, meet the needs of a sizeable population, be replicable and scalable,
and deliver taxpayer benefits in less than five years).
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id. at 20.
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implementing social services interventions could simply give
up on the SIB arrangement if it does not meet performance
objectives within the SIB investors' expected investment hori-
zon and, therefore, shut down the SIB arrangement, perhaps
prematurely. In turn, this could strand vulnerable populations
that are relying on the very social services that the SIB was set
up to scale. Some have suggested that the severe consequences
of such "shut down" risk means that SIBs should not be used
to scale core social services.56
Core or not, social services that are the object of SIB fund-
ing likely will need to be insulated from execution/perform-
ance and financial failures of SIB arrangements. At a mini-
mum, contingency plans should include strategies for re-
sponding to missed performance targets, underperforming
social service providers, and funding failures.57 Alternatively,
SIB parties might address this concern contractually by offer-
ing "step in" rights to the government contracting authority or
the SIB intermediary. These step-in rights would authorize the
government contracting authority or the SIB intermediary, act-
ing on behalf of the SIB investors, to "step in" to deal with and
fix things in place of the originally contracted social service
providers in order to ensure that important services continue
to be delivered.58
A third execution risk to the target beneficiaries of a SIB
structure is that of inappropriate actions being taken by social
service providers in order to ensure that they meet the SIB
performance targets. These actions, in turn, might subvert the
very social objectives that the SIB seeks to advance. For exam-
ple, a social service provider participating in a SIB aimed at
reducing the number of children residing in foster care might
start returning children to dangerous family situations without
sufficient regard for the children's safety. Or a social service
provider participating in a SIB aimed at prisoner recidivism
might interfere with legal processes to ensure that reconvic-
56. LIEBMAN, supra note 49, at 4.
57. Id. at 25.
58. See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 48, at 147-48 (explain-
ing that government contracting authority's "step in" rights typically relate to
specific, temporary, and urgent service failures, while lenders' "step in"
rights tend to be triggered by recurrent failures of a concessionaire or by
failures regarded as irremediable).
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tion rates are delayed or inappropriately frustrated during pe-
riods when SIB reconviction targets are to be measured.59
This execution risk can be addressed in several ways. For
example, the host government can 1) require that rigorous
due diligence be conducted regarding the financial incentive
schemes, codes of conduct, staff training, and reputation of all
selected social service providers, 2) include provisions in its
contract with the SIB intermediary that provide for possible
termination or replacement rights by the host government
and/or the imposition of stiff financial penalties should a pat-
tern of inappropriate actions by social service providers (or
their staffs) be discovered, and 3) support the establishment of
independent watchdog organizations whose function is to
make sure that vulnerable populations affected by SIB-funded
59. If either of these scenarios seems like a remote possibility, then it may
be worth reflecting on the challenges that the microfinance sector has faced
in recent years. Fuelled by growing amounts of private investor capital, some
microfinance institutions rapidly scaled the financial services they offered to
very poor individuals, only to find that some of those scaling efforts were
marked by inadequate customer protection safeguards. As a result, far from
pulling people out of poverty, some of these financial service providers ap-
pear to have turned a blind eye to the growing debt burden faced their tar-
get clientele. An influx of working capital and aggressive growth targets
caused some fast growing microfinance institutions to experience weak-
nesses in the quality of their microcredit portfolios and, related, inappropri-
ate behavior toward clients. See GRi.c. CHEN ET AL., CGAP, GROwTH VUILNERA-
mILITIES IN MICROFINANCE 9-11 (Feb. 2010), http://www.cgap.org/sites/de-
fault/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Growth-and-Vulnerabilities-in-Microfinance-
Feb-2010.pdf ("[U]nder pressure to meet targets and with limited supervi-
sory oversight, frontline staff occasionally resort to unsavory collection prac-
tices . . . ."); CGAP, ANDHRA PRADESH 2010: GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CRIsis IN INDIAN MICROFINANCE 5-6 (Nov. 2010), http://www.cgap.org/sites/
default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Andhra-Pradesh-2010-Global-Implications-
of-the-Crisis-in-Indian-Microfinance-Nov-2010.pdf (rapid expansion and
growth in microfinance portfolios can undermine credit discipline, thereby
leading to "unhealthy rises in loan amounts, cutting corners in the under-
writing process, and resulting in an excessive supply of credit. Incentives at
the field level are often based solely on disbursements and collection
volumes, with insufficient incentives for sound underwriting or customer
care."); see also CGAP, A GUIDE TO REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
MICROFINANCE: CONSENSUS GUIDELINES 52, 55-56 (Oct. 2012), http://www.
cgap.org/sites/default/files/Consensus-Guideline-A-Guide-to-Regulation-
and-Supervision-of-Microfinance-Oct-2012_0.pdf ("[R]apid growth in credit
markets that approach saturation can lead to over-lending and other behav-
iors that are not in best interest of customers . . . .").
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interventions are adequately protected and appropriately
treated.
SIB investors are also likely to be concerned about this
risk as it can damage both the social and the financial returns
on their SIB investments, as well as their reputations. They too
can take steps to influence SIB arrangements to avoid inappro-
priate behavior: 1) before an investment, through their deci-
sions about whether to invest in a particular SIB (including
due diligence as to the SIB intermediary, the likely social ser-
vice providers, and their potential fellow SIB investors) and 2)
once invested, through the influence they exert on the govern-
ance of the SIB intermediary.
C. Intermediary Risk
Intermediary risk is another kind of risk that is likely to be
of concern to host governments and SIB investors. This is the
risk that the SIB intermediary will fail to perform its obliga-
tions, which in turn would frustrate the achievement of the
SIB's social and financial goals. As SIB structures evolve, it is
likely that the role of SIB intermediaries may also shift or be
tailored to a given circumstance. In some SIBs, SIB in-
termediaries may act very proactively, much like private equity
fund managers. In other SIBs, SIB intermediaries may func-
tion more like passive trustees or fiscal agents. Intermediary
risk, therefore, can take several forms.
First, SIB intermediaries might not be up to the task of
coordinating and managing the complicated web of actors and
interests inherent in a SIB arrangement throughout the life of
the SIB investment.60 Given the novelty of the SIB structure,
this is a present danger; there is no track record in SIB inter-
mediation. As a result, many of those offering SIB intermedia-
tion services today, while able to demonstrate proven financial
and management skills, are learning on the job.
A second intermediary risk is that of a SIB intermediary
failing for reasons unrelated to its SIB roles and responsibili-
ties. This is a risk most likely to occur with SIB intermediaries
that have other financial and operational responsibilities, in
addition to their SIB activities. One way to protect against this
risk is to establish a special purpose vehicle with its own man-
60. A NEw Tooll, supra note 10, at 21.
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agement team to house the SIB intermediary function so as to
protect the assets of the SIB intermediary from other financial
claims or to avoid the distractions of (and possible conflicts of
interests with) other programmatic responsibilities.
As more SIB intermediary experience is accumulated, one
can imagine that a consensus will emerge as to best practices
in SIB governance. Drawing on such practices should also help
reduce the risk of SIB intermediary failure. Similarly, as more
organizations gain experience in SIB intermediation, there
may be opportunities for weak SIB intermediaries to be eased
out and new SIB intermediaries to be recruited. Shifts of this
nature, of course, would need to be contemplated in the SIB
documentation upfront, and the processes for removing and
substituting a SIB intermediary would need to be agreed to by
the government contracting authority as well as the affected
SIB investors.
D. Political Risk
Another key SIB risk, political risk, relates to both the ca-
pacity and the will of the host government to undertake its
obligations under a SIB structure and, equally importantly, not
to hinder others from meeting their respective SIB obliga-
tions. This political risk can manifest itself in many ways, in-
cluding interference with SIB measurement tools, forced rene-
gotiation of SIB contractual terms, manufactured delays (or
the creation of other obstacles) to passing appropriate author-
izing legislation to permit the government to meet its SIB obli-
gations, or even nonpayment of SIB obligations. The relatively
long duration of a SIB can exacerbate this risk as it increases
the likelihood of changes in key government officials or politi-
cal upheavals, as well as possible adverse shifts in economic
conditions.
Moreover, the political risk inherent in SIB structures is
likely to be heightened where the host government has only
limited experience, if any, in engaging in pay-for-success con-
tracting for social services. This kind of outcome-based con-
tractual arrangement can be complex to negotiate and man-
age, requiring a good deal of sophistication from all parties to
the arrangements, including the host government agency
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charged with administering the resulting contract.6' When
these contractual arrangements also involve SIB funding, even
greater sophistication is required of the host government.
Among the minimum abilities that host governments will
need in order to conduct a SIB negotiation are the abilities to
determine performance targets, to estimate the likely costs of
funding interventions to reach those targets, and to calculate
the performance success fees (over those estimated costs) that
are likely to attract sufficient investors to fund the SIB while
still preserving savings for the host government. It is unlikely
that many government agencies today enjoy this kind of exper-
tise in house. Therefore, host governments will be heavily reli-
ant on outside experts, many of whom, at least initially, may
also be structuring and negotiating SIB arrangements for the
first time. Training host government representatives in the le-
gal, policy, and business issues raised by SIB arrangements
could help ensure a more level playing field for host govern-
ments that are negotiating their first SIBs. Developing re-
source banks of SIB documentation and other related SIB
toolkits for use by host governments is another step that would
help ensure that governments are in a position to conduct a
SIB negotiation.62
Another contributing factor to the political risks con-
fronting SIB structures is the possibility that some SIBs may be
priced inappropriately for the financial risks and returns that
they are able to generate. In some SIB structures successful
outcomes are likely to be realized only over the medium- to
long-term (and possibly recognized only in hindsight). This
can make SIBs and their sponsoring host governments vulner-
able to the criticism that the SIB returns payable to investors
are too rich for the risks that are being taken. In turn, this
criticism can put pressure on host governments to renegotiate
61. See LIEBMAN, supra note 49, at 15.
62. To this end, expanding the PPPIRC's database to include executed
SIB transactions could be useful. Another useful next step would be further
dissemination of annotated SIB documentation or term sheets. One early
example of this latter suggestion is the draft language for SIB contracts pro-
posed by the Center for American Progress. SeeJITINDER KOHLI ET AL., CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, INSIDE A SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AGREEMENT: EXPLORING THE
CONTRACT CHALLENGES OF A NEW SOCIAL FINANCE MECHANISM (May 7, 2012),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/05/
pdf/sib agreement brief.pdf.
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the terms of SIB arrangements. 63 One way to mitigate this risk
is to build success-fee formulas for SIBs that correlate directly
with the savings generated by the performance outcomes be-
ing funded. This will not be easy. Even if a SIB-funded per-
formance outcome does generate direct budgetary savings, it
may take a very long time for those savings to be realized-
perhaps long after the SIB funding arrangement comes to an
end.64
Entrenched government interests also can pose a risk to
SIBs. As noted before,'65 SIBs bring a variety of stakeholders to
the table by design. This includes a possible mix of govern-
ment agencies, departments, and programs. Some of these
government actors may resist the coordination and delegation
of decision-making authority that SIBs require to succeed. This
resistance can be overt or, perhaps more damaging, covert. It
can be deliberate or it can result from weak governance or
poor coordination among affected government actors.
Whatever the cause of this resistance, the results can be
equally devastating to the success of a SIB structure. If per-
formance outcomes (or the measurements of such outcomes)
are sabotaged, SIB investors will be rightly outraged.
This is why many of those who are structuring and analyz-
ing SIB structures point to the critical importance of executive
leadership within the host government that is sponsoring a
SIB.6 The challenge, of course, is that political leaders
change. Therefore, for SIBs to succeed beyond one govern-
ment administration, there needs to be widespread support
63. Those who have seen the upsurge in the renegotiation rates of other
types of private/public partnerships may be collectively nodding their heads
at this possible scenario. See e.g., Eduardo Engel et al., Soft Budgets and Renego-
tiations in Public-Private Partnerships (Nat. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper Series No. 15300, August 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w15300.pdf (suggesting that government use of renegotiation to avoid
budget constraints and spending caps is pervasive in public/private partner-
ships; in one study of 1000 such partnerships in Latin America over a 20-year
span, 30% of contracts were renegotiated, with even higher renegotiation
rates for certain types of projects).
64. This may explain the McKinsey recommendation that SIB-funded in-
terventions should deliver taxpayer benefits in less than five years. See supra
note 51.
65. See supra Part IIB.
66. See McKINSEY & Co., supra note 9, at 35 (arguing that executive lead-
ership within host government is a catalyst for SIB progress).
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for the SIB structure from the host government at all levels
and, just as importantly, from the public at large. This suggests
that it will be very important to develop proactive communica-
tion strategies to ensure that not only SIB beneficiaries but
also the public at large understand the benefits of the SIB
structure.
Similarly, SIBs may need special authorization and appro-
priate legislation to ensure that the host government has suffi-
cient legal authority to bind itself to a long-term, pay-for-suc-
cess contractual obligation. The need for new laws will turn, of
course, on the extent of applicable existing legal authority that
the host government already enjoys and the nature of the pay-
ment obligations that the host government is undertaking
within the SIB structure.
Several states in the United States are contemplating67 or
have enacted legislation intended to advance the issuance of
SIBs or SIB-like financial instruments. One of the first states to
enact such legislation was Massachusetts. 68 In 2012 Massachu-
67. For example, legislators in California are considering legislation that
would offer three financing tools to engage the business sector more directly
in California's public education system. See California Career Pathways In-
vestment S.B. 594, 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.leg
islature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml. One of the SIB-like tools being
considered would allow businesses to purchase "Workforce Development
Bonds" that generate performance-based returns. See Id. at Legislative Coun-
sel's Digest. The proceeds of these Workforce Development Bonds would be
used to finance "career pathways programs" currently run by existing school
and community colleges. Id. This marks a departure from other SIBs as the
funds raised by these Workforce Development Bonds would be directed to
government entities rather than private providers of services. Kristina Costa
of the Center for American Progress notes:
For governments, social impact bonds offer a way to transfer some
of the financial risks involved in implementing or scaling preven-
tive programs until they are proven successful. That benefit may be
lost if different agencies or different levels of government are, in
effect, working on both sides of a social impact bond.
Steven Greenhut, California's Scary New Way to Raise Public Money, BLOOMBE RO
(Apr. 28, 2013, 6:00 P.M.), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-28/
california-pushes-social-impact-bond-gimmicks.html.
68. While Minnesota enacted legislation even earlier than Massachusetts,
the Minnesota program is very different. In 2011, the Minnesota legislature
approved $10 million for a program piloting "Human Capital Performance
Bonds" ("HUCAPs"), which is aimed at expanding proven workforce devel-
opment programs. See Minnesota Pay for Performance Act of 2011, MINN.
STAT. § 16A.93-16A.96 (2011) (authorizing issuance of state appropriation
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setts passed legislation to establish a sinking fund to finance
payments owed by the state on certain qualifying pay-for-suc-
cess contracts.* Among the qualifying features of these con-
tracts, they are expected to result in "significant performance
improvements and budgetary savings across all impacted agen-
bonds, appropriating money, establishing the Minnesota pay-for-perform-
ance pilot program and proposing coding for a new law in Minnesota Stat-
utes). HUCAPs are very different from the SIBs being contemplated by Mas-
sachusetts, however. Investors in the Minnesota HUCAPs are taking only
Minnesota State risk by purchasing a "moral obligation" bond that will earn
returns commensurate with that very limited state risk. Investors in the HU-
CAPs are not assuming any performance risk of the social service providers;
therefore, they. also will not earn any extra success fees if performance
targets are met. Id. Rather, the risks and returns of the social services provid-
ers not performing or under-performing in meeting the pay-for-success
targets are expected to be assumed by a group of working capital funders. Id.
Subsequent to its passage, a constitutional question was raised about
whether this legislation contravened the Minnesota State Constitution. On
October 31, 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the HUCAP leg-
islation did not run afoul of the state constitution. See generally Rob Gurwitt,
In Massachusetts, Mobilizing Private Investment for Public Good, STATEIANE (Nov.
14, 2012), available at http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/head-
lines/in-massachusetts-mobiliziig-private-investment-for-public-good-
85899430072.
69. On July 8, 2012 the State Legislature of Massachusetts approved pas-
sage of an act that sets up a trust fund to finance payments owed by the State
of Massachusetts on "pay for success contracts." MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 10,
§ 35VV. This legislation expressly authorizes the secretary of administration
and finance to enter into pay for success contracts that have the following
features:
(1) a requirement that a substantial portion of the payment be con-
ditioned on the achievement of specific outcomes based on de-
fined performance targets; (2) an objective process by which an
independent evaluator will determine whether the performance
targets have been achieved; (3) a calculation of the amount and
timing of payments that would be earned by the service provider
during each year of the agreement if performance targets are
achieved as determined by the independent evaluator; (4) a sink-
ing fund requirement under which the secretary shall request an
appropriation for each fiscal year that the contract is in effect, in an
amount equal to the expected payments that the commonwealth
would ultimately be obligated to pay in the future based upon ser-
vice provided during that fiscal year, if performance targets were
achieved; and (5) a determination by the secretary that the con-
tract will result in significant performance improvements and budg-
etary savings across all impacted agencies if the performance
targets are achieved.
Id. at § 35VV(b).
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cies if the performance targets are achieved."70 The legislation
further authorizes the Massachusetts secretary of administra-
tion and finance to provide that Massachusetts's payment obli-
gations under these pay-for-success contracts are to constitute
"a general obligation of the commonwealth [of Massachusetts]
for which the full faith and credit of the commonwealth shall
be pledged for the benefit of the providers of the contracted
government services" up to an aggregate amount of $50 mil-
lion.7 1
E. Financial Risk
In these early SIB days, the financial risks posed by SIBs
are largely borne by the SIB investors. This has limited the
pool of those interested in investing in SIBs. As SIB structures
evolve, however, other financial risk-mitigation and risk-shar-
ing tools, such as credit enhancements that provide external
collateral or support senior investment tranches in the capital
structure of the SIB, could be incorporated into the SIB struc-
ture. As a result, the pool of possible SIB investors may ex-
pand.72 Until that time, however, the financial risks posed by a
SIB to its investors are exacerbated by the fact that the SIB is a
relatively long-term, illiquid investment.
70. Id. at § 35VV(b) (5).
71. Id. at § 35VV(c). Recently, two more states have enacted legislation to
advance SIBs or SIB-like structures. These states, New Jersey and Connecti-
cut, appear to be taking a different legislative tack from Massachusetts.
Rather than authorizing the state to be the sole payor under these SIBs, New
Jersey and Connecticut appear to be looking for other funding sources to
finance those obligations that come due on pay-for-success/outcome-based
government contracts. In New Jersey, legislation that was passed by the As-
sembly in March 2013 authorizes the New Jersey Economic Development
Authority, not the state, to issue SIBs in an amount not to exceed $3 million
in any given year or $15 million in the aggregate over five years. N.J. Social
Innovation Act, supra note 38, at 5(c).
In the spring of 2012 Connecticut passed legislation that authorizes the
Office of Policy and Management secretary of the state to enter into "an
outcome-based performance contract with a social innovation investment
enterprise" for the purpose of accepting funding from the U.S. Department
of Justice for adult reentry programs. See 2012 Conn. Acts, § 128 (June 12
Spec. Sess.) (effective date July 1, 2012).
72. See generally GODEKE & Resner, supra note 29; see also A NEW TootL,
supra note 10, at 15, 22 (predicting that mainstream investors might begin to
participate in SIBs if transactions are structured to promote "creative risk
sharing").
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Another financial risk inherent in the SIB structure is the
risk that the overall transaction costs of the SIB structure may
overwhelm the financial returns to be gained in the transac-
tion. These sizeable transaction costs, which may be shared,
either directly or indirectly, with other actors in the SIB ar-
rangement include the time and money that it takes to struc-
ture a SIB. 7 - These are not the only costs. Once a SIB structure
has been put in place, there will be additional recurrent ex-
penses related to managing the SIB (paid to the SIB interme-
diary) and measuring the performance outcomes of the SIB
(paid to the SIB independent evaluator). This means that SIBs
need to be relatively large in order to support their fixed and
ongoing costs.74 It is likely that the first SIBs will be the most
expensive to set up.75 Replication and some standardization of
contracts and structures may drive SIB costs down somewhat
but not a lot, particularly if different governments or different
social issues (and, therefore, different performance targets)
are involved.76 The challenge this presents is to find ways to
lower the transaction costs of launching SIBs while still al-
lowing for sufficient customization so that SIB structures can
reflect local circumstances and particular performance targets.
73. The Peterborough SIB took approximately eighteen months to
launch. See DISLEY LT Al.., supra note 12, at 10. Social Finance estimates that it
invested approximately 2.5 person years of resources and more than 300
hours of legal advice (provided pro bono) to develop the Peterborough SIB.
Id. at 13. Some of the smaller investors in the Peterborough SIB worked to
minimize the legal and due diligence costs involved by "piggybacking" on
other larger investors' assessments. Id. at 13 ("We effectively took a common-
sense approach and said, if it's good enough for Esmee Fairbairn, it's good
enough for us-and did a light touch due diligence.").
74. The Peterborough SIB is approximately $8 million; and the New
York City SIB is $9.6 million. See also Soc. FIN., TECHNICAL. GuIDE TO COMMIS-
SIONING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDs 11 (November 2011), http://socialfinance.
org.uk/sites/default/files/technical-guide-to-commissioning socialim
pact.bonds.pdf (contract size for establishing a SIB investor-owned entity,
like that used in the Peterborough SIB, would ideally be over 10 million
pounds to cover set up and running costs).
75. Social Finance hopes cost of capital for SIBs will decline over time as
investors and markets get more comfortable. See DISLEY ET AL., supra note 12,
at 30; see also supra note 68.
76. See MCKNSEy & Co., supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that SIB scaling will
benefit from standardization and sharing of best practices).
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F. Reputation Risk
All players in a SIB structure are vulnerable to reputation
risk should the SIB transaction not succeed. Social service
providers are perhaps at the front line of reputational risk
since their failure to meet targeted outcomes could have far-
reaching implications beyond just the SIB structure.77 Yet
other SIB parties may suffer reputational risk too should a SIB
fail.
The largest reputational risk, however, is not the damage
that might occur to the reputations of a relatively small hand-
ful of SIB parties. Rather, the reputational risk that should be
of greatest concern is that of the contagion risk of highly pub-
licized SIB controversies spilling over to the marketplace more
generally. For example, imagine how politically-charged criti-
cisms of a SIB pricing structure or allegations of mistreatment
of targeted SIB beneficiaries might flow far beyond a particu-
lar controversial SIB transaction to erode the political will of
host governments in general to make good on their current or
future SIB obligations and, ultimately, to sour the investor
landscape for participating in SIB structures. Hence, as SIB
structures emerge and are tested, care should be taken to
identify and publicize the weaknesses found in existing SIB
structures so that others can avoid duplicating those mistakes.
IV.
TAKING SIBs GLOBAL
All of the above are risks that SIBs are likely to encounter
no matter where they are launched. Imagine the additional
risks that SIB investors might face when taking SIBs to coun-
77. See A NEW TOOL, supra note 10, at 22 (pointing out that social service
providers may suffer significant reputational harm which could affect donor
decisions about future funding). See also DISLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 19
(explaining that, because of intense interest of the public, Ministry of Jus-
tice, Social Finance, H.M.P. Peterborough and providers of social services all
bear reputational risk of the Peterborough SIB). The director of St. Giles
Trust, a service provider in the Peterborough SIB, indicates that
St. Giles Trust . . . is very squarely seen as one of the key delivery
agents. We've spent . . . 50 years ... building up a reputation that
we're a very robust service-delivery charity that makes a real impact
on clients, so it's not so much that the financial risks I'm facing, but
it's certainly reputational risk.
Id.
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tries where any or all of the following factors are present: weak
governance at all levels of government (federal, state, munici-
pal), political and/or financial instability, severely limited fi-
nancial resources to pay for social services of any kind, deeply
marginalized citizens, and heightened vulnerability to regional
and global conflicts.
Just dealing with the foreign exchange risks that a long-
term SIB payment stream could present to international inves-
tors is challenging. In addition, some developing countries will
realize little, if any, budgetary savings upon reaching a success-
ful preventive outcome because their governments do not cur-
rently provide or fund related remedial social services. In in-
stances like these, a moral hazard is embedded in the SIB
structure. In short, a successful SIB will be more expensive for
a host government than an unsuccessful SIB, and this fact
could provide the host government with a perverse financial
incentive to interfere with or sabotage the achievement of SIB
performance outcomes.
Taking SIBs global, particularly to the countries and socie-
ties most in need of large-scale preventive social services, re-
quires caution, a critical rethinking of the SIB structure, and
even a possible shift in how financial incentives are aligned
within SIB partnerships. Yet, because SIBs may be able to drive
sizeable amounts of funding toward challenges that require a
variety of interventions, they may actually be particularly well
suited to addressing some of the most complex social service
problems confronting many emerging markets and their vul-
nerable populations. Furthermore, SIBs may be able not only
to take full advantage of the social finance innovations that
have already been developed and are being implemented
around the world; they may also be able to push these social
financial innovations still further, just as SIBs are likely to be
integrated increasingly into pay-for-success government con-
tracts here in the United States.
As SIBs are brought to emerging markets, there is likely to
be a wide variation in the deal structures used as parties re-
spond to perceived counterparty risk of nonperformance (or
inappropriate actions undertaken) by the host government.
This article offers three possible deal structures that might be
used-individually, sequentially, or in combination-to man-
age this risk:
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1. Non-host governmental SIBs. Limit the host government's
role in the SIB transaction by using a more credible and/or
financially sound development assistance organization or de-
velopment finance institution as the contracting authority
and, thus, as the SIB payor,
2. Credit-enhanced SIBs. Improve the financial viability of
the SIB structure by making use of a third party credit en-
hancement; and
3. Social Impact Performance Guarantees. Shorten the du-
ration of SIB investors' "at risk" capital by involving SIB in-
vestors primarily as guarantors, rather than funders, of the
upfront, working capital to be provided to social service prov-
iders.
Of course, these are not the only possible structural varia-
tions that could be used in a SIB structure where the capacity
or will of the host government to meet its contractual obliga-
tions under a pay-for-success contract is in doubt.7 8 In some
cases, individual elements from one or more of these options
could be included in the same SIB structure. It is also likely
that the structure of SIB deals within a single country will
change over time to reflect shifts in SIB investor confidence in
the host government's performance of its SIB-related obliga-
tions. Accordingly, thought should be given to how SIB struc-
tural variations are sequenced within a country so as to reward
performing host governments with more SIB funding over
time.
A. Non-Host Governmental SIBs
Removing the host government from the SIB structure, at
least insofar as it has any financial obligations to make SIB pay-
ments, may be the easiest and certainly the least costly of these
three SIB variations.79 For this scenario to work, however,
78. See generally GODEKE & RESNER, supra note 29, for a brief discussion
of government counterparty risk mitigation.
79. This is one focus of the work of the Development Impact Bonds
Working Group that the Center for Global Development has convened in
partnership with Social Finance. See Soc. FIN. & CTR. FOR GLOBm. DEV., DE-
VELOPMENT IMPACT BONDS WORKING GROUP BRIEFING NOTE: MEETING 1-29
MAY 2012, http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Groups/Development%
20Impact%20Bonds%20Briefing%2ONote.pdf (explaining that while the de-
velopment impact bond structure is a variation on the SIB structure, among
other differences, development impact bond could look to donors, host
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there would need to be another, more credible source of pay-
ment for SIB investors. That could be where development as-
sistance organizations and development finance institutions
step into the SIB structure and the host government steps out.
Some development agencies are likely to find this approach
appealing on policy grounds, as well as on financial grounds,
since the development funding that they allocate to support-
ing a SIB would be used only for interventions that "work" (as
measured by the SIB performance targets), thereby allowing
them to avoid paying for failed interventions.
There are, however, several downsides with this approach.
The first downside, and possibly the most unlikely, is that this
approach becomes too successful, leading to public pressure
to "privatize" much of the costs of development assistance
through widespread use of SIB transactions. As was noted ear-
lier, however, not every social service intervention is amenable
to a SIB-like arrangement, and equally, not every host govern-
country, or combination of the two to remunerate investors); see also supra
note 6.
One of the first development assistance institutions seriously to consider
use of a SIB-like structure to support its grant-making activities is the United
Kingdom's Department for International Development ("DFID"). DFID has
started exploring the use of development impact bonds that would provide
DFID funding for investor payouts upon the successful achievement of suc-
cessful performance targets as part of the United Kingdom's broader "pay by
results" initiative. See DFID Pilots on Payment by Results, U.K- GOv'T, https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachinent-data/file/
49552/dfid-pilots-payments-results.pdf (accessed Apr. 14, 2013); see also U.K.
DEI'T FOR INT'L Djv., GIRLS' EDUCATION CHALLENGE: BUSINESS CASE V.4
(June 2012), available at http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=20
2372 (accessed Apr. 14, 2013); CTR. FOR GIoBAL DEV. & Soc. FIN., DEVFto-I
MENT IMPACT BONDS BRIEFING NOTE-MAY 2013, http://international.cgdev.
org/sites/default/files/Development%20Impact%20Bonds%2OBriefing%
20Note%20-%202.pdf (describing a development impact bond structure
with donors paying the outcome payments instead of host government).
The City of Fresno, California also is contemplating a SIB-like financing
to tackle a healthcare problem-chronic asthma. See Manuela Badawy, Cali-
fornia City Seeks to Cut Asthma Rate via Bond Issue, RE-UTERS (Oct. 19, 2012,
10:50 A.M.), http://www.reuiters.coin/article/2012/10/19/us-investing-im-
pactbonds-health-idUSBRE891OUl20121019. Twenty percent of Fresno's
population suffers from chronic asthma, while only eight percent suffer na-
tionally. Id. If this transaction moves forward, it will be the first municipality
in the United States to use a SIB-like funding structure. Id. In this pilot,
however, the SIB payor is expected to be a not-for-profit organization, not
the City of Fresno. Id.
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ment is ready for such an arrangement. On the other hand,
the development agency that is acting as the payor in a SIB
structure could find itself subjected to second-guessing and
political attacks regarding the amount of "success fees" it has
paid to its SIB investors. It does not take an overactive imagina-
tion to picture a U.S. news organization or a member of Con-
gress, for example, lambasting USAID for paying a tidy profit
to a SIB investor like Goldman Sachs.80
The second downside, perhaps more troubling, is that
this approach does little to change the attitudes or perform-
ance of the host government since it has been removed from
the transaction. This lost opportunity could mean that, while
individual SIBs may succeed under this variation, host govern-
ments will continue to provide social services to their popula-
tions (or not) with little regard to the actual outcomes of such
services. The counter-argument might be that a development
agency-sponsored SIB could provide an important demonstra-
tion effect to host governments that would eventually spur the
host government to engage in similar SIB initiatives.
Third is the chance that, while some private investors will
be disinclined to enter into any financial arrangements where
they are obligated to pay for a development agency's mistake
(i.e., a poorly conceived or executed SIB), other investors may
be concerned that they are not generating sufficient impact
with this kind of donor government-sponsored SIB invest-
ment. This latter group may worry that they are merely displac-
ing public sector capital with their own private sector capital.
For these more "impact" oriented investors, it is likely that they
will need to be convinced that 1) the SIB being presented to
them by a donor agency is spurring a greater financial commit-
ment by the development agency to the particular develop-
ment goal being addressed by the SIB than otherwise would
take place, or 2) the demonstration value to the host govern-
ment of the SIB is so high that the host government itself will
begin to assume more responsibility in future SIB transactions.
B. SIs with Credit Enhancements
A second SIB variation embeds a credit enhancement or
other type of risk mitigation instrument into the SIB structure
80. See discussion supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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so as to lower the financial risk to SIB investors and, thereby,
the ultimate cost of the SIB to the host government. This en-
hancement could take many forms, ranging from political risk
insurance to third party guarantees. The following discussion
looks at two very different types of credit enhancements that
have been used, or are now available to be used, to reduce the
risks and thus lower the costs of development-oriented
projects. It also explores whether similar credit enhancements
might be applied to SIB structures that involve a cross-border
financing where many of the SIB investors sit far from the
country where the SIB social services are being delivered.
1. Political Risk Insurance: Non-Honoring of Sovereign Financial
Obligations
One product that could evolve to become a useful credit
enhancement for SIB obligations is a new political risk insur-
ance product issued by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency ("MIGA"), a member of the World Bank Group. The
product, called Non-Honoring of Sovereign Financial Obliga-
tions ("NHSFO"), takes advantage of recent changes in
MIGA's convention,"' and provides political risk insurance to
transactions involving the financial obligations of sovereigns
and sub-sovereigns. The NHSFO as currently designed sup-
81. Press release, MIGA, MIGA Significantly Expands Pool of Eligible In-
vestments (Nov. 14, 2010), available at http://www.miga.org/news/index.
cfn?stid=1837&aid=2823 (reporting the November 14, 2010 amendments to
the MIGA Convention). In 2010 MIGA's Council of Governors approved the
first changes to MIGA's convention since the agency's establishment in 1988.
Id. These changes gave MIGA broader scope to determine eligibility for in-
vestments that are aligned with MIGA's requirements. Id. Of particular rele-
vance to the launch of the NHSFO product for debt investments, MIGA now
is permitted to insure stand-alone debt investments in projects (rather than
its past requirement to insure debt investments only when also insuring eq-
uity investments). Id. MIGA issued its NHSFO product in mid-2011. See New
MIGA Cover Tackles Istanbul Gridlock: Getting Dowm to Business under MIGA's
Expanded Convention, MUtTnLATERA1. INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (une
13, 2011), http://www.imiga.org/news/index.cfm?aid=3107.
Other types of political risk insurance could also be helpful to SIB inves-
tors in connection with a cross-border SIB investment. For example, SIB in-
vestors may consider currency inconvertibility coverage or political violence
coverage. For a description of political risk insurance, including various
types, see Political Risk Insurance, Overseas Private Investment Corporation-
What We Offer, www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2013).
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
4852013]
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
ports projects that "involve either a direct payment obligation
of the government, or a government guarantee of the obliga-
tions of a state-owned enterprise or public-private partnership
joint venture."82 Essentially, the NHSFO insures lenders
against losses resulting from the failure of a government (sov-
ereign or sub-sovereign) to make a payment when due because
of the government's inability or unwillingness to pay," but
"only if the financial payment obligation of the sovereign is
unconditional and not subject to any defenses-meaning that
there are no grounds on which the sovereign could defend
legally against the fact that the obligation is due." 4 Given the
uncertainty that surrounds the ultimate timing and amount of
SIB payments to be made to SIB investors, NHSO coverage as
currently defined may not fit well into a SIB structure. Creative
SIB innovators, however, may be able to develop SIB arrange-
ments that meet, at least in part, this unconditional payment
obligation so that the SIB payments are an insurable risk.85 Or
NHSO coverage could be expanded beyond its current scope.
In either case, if it is possible to structure all or part of the host
government's payments to SIB investors so that a SIB payment
82. MIGA, MIGA's NON-HONORING OF SOVEREIGN FINANCIAL Om.IGA-
TIONS 1 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter MIGA NHSFO Brief], http://www.miga.
org/documents/NHSFObrief.pdf.
83. See id.
84. Id.; see also MIGA, CONTRACT OF GUARANTEE FOR NON-SHAREHOLDER
LOANS, NON-HONORING OF A SOVEREIGN FINANCIAL OBLIGATION art. 3 (Dec.
2012), http://www.miga.org/documents/disclosure/Contract%20of%20
Guarantee%20for%2ONon-Shareholder%2OLoans-NHSO.pdf. Under the
sample MIGA NHSFO contract, "Sovereign Financial Obligation" means:
an unconditional financial obligation of the Governing Authority to
pay a sum certain, either on a date certain or on demand, which
obligation is either:
(a) in favor of the Guarantee Holder; or
(b) in favor of the Project Enterprise (whose rights against the
Governing Authority have been collaterally assigned to the
Guarantee Holder),
and which is not subject to any defenses other than payment, and may
include without limitation an unconditional guarantee of a third
party's financial obligations or an obligation to invest or contribute
funds, either on a date certain or on demand ....
Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added).
85. One possible avenue to explore is to determine whether a demand
notice served on a host government for SIB principal payments (as opposed
to the less easily quantified sliding success fees) under a SIB contract might
qualify as an insurable risk under NHSFO contracts.
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obligation would be covered by NHSO insurance, then this
new political risk insurance product could become a powerful
tool for taking SIBs global, particularly to markets where host
government counterparty risk is high.86
2. Rolling Credit Guarantees
As noted previously, the New York City SIB enjoys a roll-
ing guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies.8 7 To summa-
rize, this guarantee fund is held by the MDRC. Should any
funds remain in the guarantee fund after this first SIB is paid
out, the MDRC can use those remaining guarantee funds to
support another SIB.
Although this rolling guarantee fund reduces investor
risk, it presents two challenges. First, it will take several years
before MDRC will be able to determine whether it needs the
full amount of the Bloomberg guarantee to make payouts to
Goldman Sachs. This could delay the launch of other valuable
SIB structures. Second, it presumes that the MDRC will con-
tinue to be the most appropriate intermediary for those next
SIB structures.
A large rolling guarantee fund that is not dependent on
just one SIB intermediary and that supports multiple SIBs, si-
multaneously pooling SIB risk across several transactions,
could hold even greater promise for the SIB ecosystem. To
that end, some lessons might be learned from another devel-
opment-oriented, rolling guarantee fund-the Grameen
Growth Guarantees program.
Launched in 2005 by the Grameen Foundation
("Grameen"), the Grameen Growth Guarantees program is
"one of the microfinance industry's largest financing efforts
dedicated to ensuring local currency financing for rapidly
86. Another reason that qualifying for NHSFO insurance could be a pow-
erful tool for expanding the SIBs globally is that this insurance product was
designed to be Basel II compliant. This means that commercial banks bene-
fiting from NSHFO coverage may receive capital relief, which in turn could
allow them to continue lending into MIGA member countries. See MIGA
NHSFO Brief, supra note 82, at 1. Accordingly, this new insurance product
might be able to help SIB structures also attract commercial bank lenders as
SIB investors.
87. GODIKE & RESNER, supra note 29, at 22.
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growing microfinance institutions."8 8 The program relies on a
pool of $60 million being made available by donor-guarantors
who "provide their names and credit while continuing to earn
returns on their individual investment portfolios."I This do-
nor/guarantor pool is used as collateral to support standby let-
ters of credit issued by a money center bank to local banks,
which in turn make loans to microfinance institutions that are
located in the banks' respective countries of operation."1 Since
the inception of the Grameen Growth Guarantee program, it
has raised more than $200 million in local-currency funding
for 24 microfinance institutions.9'
There are several aspects of the Grameen Growth Guaran-
tee program that could inform the structure of a SIB rolling
guarantee fund. Perhaps the most important question to ask
when considering a third party guarantee is who should be the
guarantor(s)? Grameen has largely looked to high net worth
individuals to act as its donor/guarantors. As the Grameen
Growth Guarantee program demonstrates, this is a highly suc-
cessful funding strategy for guarantee pools of $60 million.
Less clear is whether high net worth individuals will support
much larger guarantee pools.
One alternative to finding high net worth individuals will-
ing to act as guarantors is to look to a donor country (or coun-
tries) to be the source of the credit enhancement. The Inter-
national Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) provides a
88. What We Do: Financing Microfinance, GRAmEEN FOUND., http://www.
grameenfoundation.org/what-we-do/microfinance/financing-microfinance
(last visited May 10, 2013) [hereinafter What We Do].
89. Id. There are two interesting U.S. tax consequences for donor/guar-
antors related to this structure. First, during the time that the donor/guar-
antor funds are held as collateral for the issuer of the standby letters of
credit donor/guarantors will be subject to tax on the earnings and gains that
they realize on such assets. If there is a draw on this collateral that results in
all or some of the donor/guarantor's pooled assets being transferred to sat-
isfy Grameen's obligations under this program, however, the donor/guaran-
tor should be entitled to a charitable contribution deduction at the time that
it passes those assets to the Grameen Foundation in the form of a grant. The
value of this deduction will be equal to the value of the assets transferred
(provided that those assets consist of cash and qualifying long term capital
gain assets that are not subject to reduction under Section 170(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code).
90. What We Do, supra note 88.
91. Id.
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striking example of a large fund supported by pledges from
many sovereign donors. Since its inception in 2006, the IFFIm
has generated new private investment for immunization pro-
grams carried out by the GAVI Alliance.9 2 IFFIm uses long-
term pledges (up to twenty years) from Australia, United King-
dom, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden,
and South Africa to support payments on "vaccine bonds" that
it then sells to private investors that want a market-based finan-
cial return and development impact. 3 As of July 2012, IFFIm
had raised $3.7 billion from investors, of which $2 billion has
been used to fund the purchase and delivery of vaccines. 94
Yet, as IFFIm currently is experiencing, the value of a sov-
ereign credit enhancement is only as good as the creditworthi-
ness and commitment of its sovereign donor/pledgor. As of
December 2012, all three of the major rating agencies
(Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch) had a negative out-
look on the high ratings they assigned to IFFIm bonds. 5 It
92. See INTERNATIONAl. FINANCE FACILITY FOR IMMUNIZATION, http://www.
IFFIm.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). The GAVI Alliance is a public/private
partnership of developing-country and donor governments, the World
Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank, the vaccine industry in in-
dustrialized and developing countries, research and technical agencies, civil
society organizations and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. GAVI ALLu-
ANCE, http://www.gavialliance.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
93. Under the IFFIm structure, sovereign donors enter into a pledge
agreement with the GAVI Alliance that specifies their overall pledge
amounts and payment schedules for providing such pledged amounts. Over
time GAVI grants (it does not lend) to IFFIm the donors' pledged amounts.
IFFIm uses this right to future cash flows to access the international debt
markets by issuing notes to private investors. The pledged amounts granted
to IFFlin are then used for debt service on the notes and operating ex-
penses. See ANNETTE SWAHIA, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, CREDIT ANALYSIS:
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE FACILIT-Y FOR IMMUNISATION 2 (Dec. 20, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.iffim.org/library/documents/ratings-reports/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2013).
94. See GAVI ALLr.IANCE, http://www.gavialliance.org (last visited Jan. 10,
2013).
95. See Announcement, Moody's Investors Services, Moody's Changes
Outlook on Aaa Rating of IFFIm to Negative; Ratings Affirmed" (Dec. 14,
2012), http://www.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PR_262
294&WT.mc-id=NLTITLEYYYYMMDDPR 262294. Moody's notes that its
negative outlook on the rating is reflects not only recent downgrades of do-
nors to IFFIm but also the "low-probability but high-impact event whereby a
significant portion of the donor payments, on which IFFIm is reliant, could
face disruption owing to the high correlation of donors' credit standings."
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should be noted, however, that the development purpose of
the IFFIm bonds appears to reinforce the perceived commit-
ment of the sovereign donors in the eyes of the rating agen-
cies. Moody's, for example, has noted that not only are the
donor countries financially able and legally bound to meet
their IFFIm commitments but the donor countries also share a
strong commitment to make good on their pledges given the
developmental purpose to which the pledged funds are being
put.96
Thus, IFFIm bonds offer a cautionary, yet optimistic, les-
son for SIB structures that might seek credit enhancements in
the form of long-term pledges or guarantees from sovereign
donors-namely, sovereign risk can be found in the contrac-
tual obligations of developed as well as developing countries.
Accordingly, SIB investors that act in reliance on the perform-
ance of such sovereign donor pledges or guarantees should
make sure that the sovereign donors have the long-term finan-
cial ability and political will to honor their commitments.
A second structural issue to consider when developing a
rolling guarantee is to determine the amount of leverage that
the guarantee is intended to generate. Or, to put it in the SIB
context, how much risk exposure should SIB guarantors cover
and how much risk should SIB investors assume? The
Grameen Growth Guarantee program very successfully lever-
aged its donor/guarantors funds so that for each $1 of donor/
guarantor support in the form of a standby letter of credit it
has attracted around $4 in local bank funding to microfinance
SWAHIA, supra note 93, at 1, 4 (explaining that France is IFFIm's second-
largest donor; France, Spain, and Italy's original total pledges to IFFIm com-
prise 41.4% of the total pledges over IFFIm's full life). See also STANDARD &
PooR's RATING SERVICES, RESEARCH UPDATE: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE FACIL-
ITY FOR IMMUNISATION "AA+/A-1+" RATINGS AFFIRMED; OUTLOOK REMAINS
NEGATIVE (December 17, 2012) (stating that outlook remains negative, re-
flecting negative outlooks on IFFIm donor sovereigns); Press Release, Fitch
Ratings, Fitch Affirms International Finance Facility for Immunisation at
"AAA"; Outlook Negative (Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Fitch Press Release].
96. SWAHLA, sup-a note 93, at I (stating that donors' continued strong
ability to make scheduled payments is reinforced by "very strong" donor will-
ingness to honor pledges based on IFFIm's developmental purpose); see alo
Fitch Press Release, supra note 95 (explaining that strong donor support is
due to high overall credit quality, legally binding nature of pledge commit-
ments, and "severe reputational damage" to any repudiating donor).
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institutions. 7 Are there potential guarantors that would also
be more likely to join a SIB transaction if they saw their guar-
antees catalyzing similar amounts of funding?
A final structural issue is to determine the appropriate
length of time for a SIB rolling guarantee fund to "roll."
Which interests should inform that decision-those of host
governments wishing to participate in SIBs, potential SIB in-
vestors, or those who are being tapped to be SIB guarantors?
The short answer is that all of these interests should be consid-
ered. The longer answer is that SIB guarantors that agree to
participate in a rolling guarantee generally would need to have
a significantly longer investment horizon than the SIB inves-
tors in any single SIB transaction or there will be little room
for any guarantee to roll. A rolling guarantee could be struc-
tured, however, so as to permit individual guarantors to exit at
their own option, provided that the exiting guarantors make
good on any and all SIB guaranteed obligations that were in-
curred during the time of their guarantee.
While the foregoing is not an exhaustive list of questions
that would-be architects of a SIB rolling guarantee fund
should consider, it is perhaps a start.""
C. Variation on SIBs
One particularly thorny issue that challenges those who
are intent on taking SIBs or SIB-like structures to emerging
markets is the long period during which SIB investors' capital
may be put at risk.'9 Because of the relatively long duration of
SIB contractual arrangements and the (related) limited liquid-
ity of SIB investments themselves, nearly every SIB investor to-
day is likely to be a "buy and hold" long-term investor. Unless
97. What We Do, supra note 88.
98. In addition to these structural issues, there also are important opera-
tional issues to consider. Grameen, for example, created eligibility criteria
and due diligence processes to ensure that it chose wisely when selecting
microfinance institutions that would benefit from this Growth Guarantee
program. See GRAMImN FoUND., GRAMEEN FOUNDATION GROWTH GUARANTEES,
http://www.grameencapital.in/images/growth-guarantees.pdf.
99. There are structural ways to try to tighten these long investment hori-
zons of SIBs, such as tranching over time the SIB investors' disbursements.
The challenge, however, is balancing the timing of tranched disbursements
against social service providers' need to obtain upfront funding to run their
operations.
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they are philanthropically motivated, investors who are willing
to take a chance on such a long-term, illiquid investment in an
emerging market context are likely to do so only at a steep
price. This high cost of capital itself can make a SIB transac-
tion impractical. Accordingly, the following discussion focuses
on finding a way to shorten the period during which private
investors' capital is at risk, while still finding a source of up-
front funding that can be provided to social service providers.
1. Performance-Based Debt Buy-Downs
One already-existing social finance innovation that seems
particularly amenable to being supported by a SIB-like struc-
ture (and vice versa) is the World Bank and International De-
velopment Agency ("IDA") performance-based debt buy-down
mechanism. The World Bank Group started piloting perform-
ance-based debt buy-downs in polio eradication projects for
Pakistan and Nigeria that were approved by the World Bank
Board between 2003 and 2005.100 Just as SIBs can expand the
reach and accountability of pay-for-success government con-
tracts, integrating SIBs into the performance-based debt buy-
down agreements being arranged by the World Bank and IDA
in their respective countries of operation also could expand
the reach and accountability of those agreements.
This is how the debt buy-down works in concept. First, the
IDA or the World Bank issues a loan to a host government, the
proceeds of which are to be used to pay for services that are
likely to achieve specific performance outcomes.10 1 Then, if
the agreed performance outcomes are achieved, grant money
from philanthropists and development assistance organiza-
100. SeeWom.o BANK, HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT: THE WORLD BANK STRATEGY
FOR HEALTH, NUTRITION & POPULATION RESULTs 56 (2007) [hereinafter
WORLD BANK HNP STRATEGY], http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-1154048816
360/HNPStrategyFINALApril3O2007.pdf (first projects took place in Paki-
stan and Nigeria). Many of the World Bank/IDA projects benefiting from
the performance-based debt buy-down mechanism are health-related. In
part, this financial innovation was born out of the growing awareness that
good governance and accountability are critical determinants of health sys-
tem performance. Id. at 28. Also, as the World Bank has acknowledged, it is
handicapped by the fact that the World Bank is required to affect health
outcomes only indirectly by "using its lending and nonlending services to
influence domestic actors, particularly governments." Id. at 55.
101. Id. at 56.
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tions "buys down" this loan (in all or in part).o 2 If the agreed
performance outcomes are not achieved, then the loan re-
mains a debt obligation to be serviced by the host government
and repaid to IDA or the World Bank.'1
The types of IDA or World Bank projects that are eligible
for a debt buy-down must include all of the following features:
* Significant cross-border externalities. The primary se-
lection criterion is that eligible projects or project
components must have significant positive cross-
border externalities linked to the achievement of
the [Millennium Development Goals].
* Measurable outcomes. Projects or components must
have measurable and feasible outcomes that can be
achieved through policy actions by the government
so that the trigger-point for buying down the credit
will be transparent and objective. Countries must
also have adequate monitoring systems to measure
these outcomes.
* Standard Bank appraisal requirements. Projects must
meet appraisal requirements and standards applied
to all projects. In particular, investment in a project
using a credit buy-down must be supported by a
strong political commitment by the government
and be used for activities that are cost-effective, fis-
cally sound, and equity enhancing.1014
Since the initial Pakistan polio eradication pilot that was
approved by the World Bank's Board of Directors in 2003, the
World Bank has approved additional financing for two further
debt buy-down projects in Pakistan. Most recently, in April
2011, the World Bank Board of Directors approved $41 mil-
lion for the "Third Partnership for Polio Eradication Project,"
which provides financial resources to the Pakistan government
to procure the Oral Polio Vaccine as part of the Pakistan gov-
ernment's efforts to immunize 32 million children against po-
lio with the ultimate goal of eradicating polio from the coun-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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try. 0 5 These Pakistan transactions were supported by grant
funds provided by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and
Rotary International (through the United Nations Fund) to an
IDA-administered fund called the Polio Eradication Trust
Funds ("PETFs"). PETFs is charged with buying down IDA
debt incurred by recipient countries for successful implemen-
tation of polio eradication projects.i0 6 PETFs will pay all appli-
cable service charges and commitment charges, if any, on the
IDA debt extended to Pakistan for this purpose; and, most per-
tinent to this discussion, PETFs will buy down the net present
value of this IDA debt obligation upon successful completion
of the project, as determined by a performance audit con-
ducted by an independent agency competitively selected by
the World Bank.107
Another recent example of a performance-based debt
buy-down mechanism is a project in Botswana that aims to
contribute to the increased efficiency of Botswana's national
HIV/AIDs program.118 This was the first time the buy-down
105. See Pakistan-Third Partnership for Polio Eradication Project-AF,
WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P125109/af-third-part
nership-polio-eradication-project?lang=en (last visited May 10, 2013).
106. See Press Release, World Bank, World Bank to Help Immunize 32 Mil-
lion Children in Pakistan Against Polio, No. 2011/439/SAR (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://go.worldbank.org/NCZZUK490; see also WORLD BANK, EMERGENCY
PROJEcr PAPER ON A PROPOSED ADDITIONAL CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR
26.1 MILIoN ($41 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE ISLAMIC REPunuc OF PAKI-
STAN FOR A THIRD PARTNERSHIP FOR POLIO ERADICATION PROJEcT, Report No:
60329 (2011), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSCon
tentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/04/13/000333037_20110413005343/Render
ed/PDF/603290PJPROPl21e0onlyl910BOX358335B.pdf.
107. Id.
108. Botswana was the first African country to provide no-cost antire-
troviral therapy to its citizens. Press Release, World Bank, New Project to
Strengthen HIV/AIDs Prevention Efforts in Botswana (Jan. 29, 2009) [here-
inafter World Bank, Press Release], http://go.worldbank.org/IEUI9D7A50.
ByJune 2008, antiretroviral coverage in Botswana reached an estimated 93%
of the population, yet the national adult prevalence rate of HIV/AIDs was
nearly 24%. Id. According to the World Bank, the government's previous
preference for a "treatment-oriented" program resulted in less focus on pre-
vention outcomes. THE WORLD BANK, HELPING BOTSWANA CONFRONT A CHAL-
LENGING FUTURE 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, BOTSWANA], http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/BotswanaChallenges4-7-10.
pdf. By implementing a performance-based debt buy-down for Botswana, the
World Bank is deliberately attempting to help Botswana move from an emer-
gency, remedial response to a more strategic, prevention approach. Id. at 2.
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mechanism was used in Africa. Because the World Bank cate-
gorizes Botswana as an upper middle income country, which
makes it ineligible for an IDA credit, the buy-down is linked to
a World Bank loan.1t9 Another difference is that the Botswana
debt buy-down will be applied just to interest payments owed
on this World Bank loan and not to the principal amount. The
World Bank loan is $50 million and is supported by a grant
contribution of approximately $20 million from the European
Commission to be applied to a performance-based buy-down
of the interest payments owed on this World Bank financing
should the performance targets be reached.'"
So, as with SIBs, these World Bank/IDA performance-
based debt buy-downs: 1) establish measurable performance
outcome objectives, 2) apply independent monitoring and as-
sessment of the targeted performance outcomes, and 3) link
the results of these performance outcomes to financial incen-
tives for the host government (in this case, the conversion of
an outstanding debt obligation of the host government into a
grant if the targets are achieved, or the continuation of the
outstanding debt obligation of the host government if the
targets are missed). I"I There is also a fourth element to this
109. This is the second buy-down of a World Bank loan (as opposed to an
IDA credit). The first buy-down mechanism of a World Bank loan was to
support tuberculosis control in China. Id at 3.
110. See World Bank, Press Release, supra note 108. The targets for this
World Bank loan are as follows:
* Improved performance of the National Aids Coordinating
Agency[;]
* Reduction in proportion of sexually active males and females
who report having had sex with more than one partner in the
past 12 months by age group[;]
* Increase in proportion of youths aged 15-to[-]19[ ]years and 20-
to-24 years who both correctly identify ways of preventing the sex-
ual transmission of HIV and who reject major misconceptions
about HIV transmission[;]
* Increase in proportion of youth aged 15-to-19 years and 20-to-24
years reporting either (a) no sexual activity[ ] or (b) condom use
during the last sexual encounter with a non-regular partner in
the past 12 months[; and]
* Reduction of proportion of people 15-to-19 years and 20-to-24
years who report a sexual partner with more than 10 years age
difference during the last 12 months.
WORMn BANK, BOTSWANA, supra note 108, at 2.
Ill. WoRLD BANK HNP STRATEGY, supra note 100, at 56.
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debt buy-down mechanism that some SIB structures now (and,
in the future, increasingly may) avail themselves of: sizeable
philanthropic capital that is keenly interested in seeing per-
formance objectives realized.
On the other hand, there are several significant differ-
ences between the performance-based debt buy-down mecha-
nism and SIBs. A first difference is that there are two possible
sources of budgetary savings for the host government under
the debt buy-down mechanism. As in SIB structures, it is possi-
ble that budgetary outlays will be reduced as a result of the
improved performance outcomes resulting from a successful
performance-based debt buy-down. The amount of these
budgetary savings, however, will turn on the amount, if any,
that the host government is otherwise spending on the prob-
lem that is being addressed by the debt buy-down. Additionally
and perhaps more importantly, host governments will realize
direct budgetary savings as a result of the debt reduction that
is provided upon the achievement of performance outcomes.
A second difference is that the upfront capital needed to scale
the contracted social services is being provided by the World
Bank/IDA rather than by private sector investors. A third dif-
ference is that there is no intermediary function being per-
formed by a private sector entity in the debt buy-down mecha-
nism. This leaves much more control and responsibility in the
hands of the host government.
2. Integrating Private Sector Investors into Performance-Based Debt
Buy-Downs
What role, if any, is there for a private sector investor in a
SIB-like structure that is built on the backbone of a perform-
ance-based debt buy-down mechanism offered by international
financial institutions like the World Bank and IDA? There are
at least three reasons to include private investors in such buy-
down arrangements. First, private investors can bring addi-
tional funds to augment the capital being provided by the
World Bank/IDA to finance the social services being con-
tracted. In turn, this reduces over time the amount of public
sector funds needed to finance such social services. Second, by
integrating private investors as co-financers, even if only in
small part, into early-stage performance-based debt buy-downs,
host governments have an opportunity to demonstrate their
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capacity to deliver on pay-for-success contracts. Such a demon-
stration should mean that participating investors are more
likely to co-invest in future buy-down schemes, and the size of
success fees (or, to put it differently, the risk premium)
needed to attract private investors would diminish over
time.'I 12Third, private investors, particularly if they are local
investors, may be able to exert additional market and political
accountability over the host government involved in this finan-
cial public/private partnership.
Even with these advantages, there are significant costs that
a structure like that described above could still incur-particu-
larly, costs attributable to foreign exchange risks if any private
investors are foreign and the funding is long term. It is also
possible that some governments are avoiding participating in
these performance-based debt buy-downs because they are
concerned about incurring sizeable loans where their repay-
ment obligations depend on the capacity of private sector ac-
tors-the social service providers-to perform. Put differently,
for a host government, there is a strong incentive to avoid tak-
ing a risk on a performance-based debt buy-down because a
failed performance-based debt buy-down leaves the govern-
ment with a considerable debt obligation to IDA or the World
Bank and no measurable improvement in the development
goal that the buy-down was meant to address. So, another op-
tion is to introduce to the performance-based debt buy-down
mechanism a financial instrument well known to anyone who
112. As discussed previously in Part IV, in SIB structures where the host
government has a payment obligation that is linked to the successful comple-
tion of a performance target, there can be an inherent moral hazard risk.
That is, the host government could be financially better off if the perform-
ance outcomes that otherwise would trigger a payment obligation by the gov-
ernment are "just missed." This moral hazard is not present in the perform-
ance-based debt buy-down mechanism because the host government reaches
a better financial outcome, that of debt reduction, if the performance out-
comes are fully achieved. Accordingly, the prospect of some debt relief, per-
haps even a sliding scale of debt relief that is tied to the degree of success,
should reduce the likelihood of a host government interfering, intentionally
or unintentionally, with the achievement of targeted outcomes and delivery
of social services aimed at achieving those outcomes. Moreover, incorporat-
ing the World Bank Group when performance outcomes are being assessed
reduces the risk that the host government would tamper with the data being
evaluated.
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
2013] 497
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
engages in government construction contracts: performance
guarantees (also called surety bonds).
3. Social Impact Performance Guarantees ("SIP Guarantees")
A performance guarantee typically involves three par-
ties-the performance guarantor, the contractor/concession-
aire, and the beneficiary of the guarantee (the contracting
government authority).' 13 Under a performance guarantee, in
the case of a performance failure, the performance guarantor
can choose to 1) rectify the problem itself, 2) obtain another
contractor to rectify the problem and compensate the con-
tracting authority for losses caused by the failure to perform,
or 3) discharge its guarantee obligations solely by payment of
money to the contracting authority." 4 In short, the perform-
ance guarantor performs many of the management functions
that the SIB structure now delegates to the SIB intermediary,
such as monitoring and providing general oversight with re-
spect to the SIB's overall performance.
Performance guarantors themselves, however, must
demonstrate their financial ability to compensate the con-
tracting authority in the event of contractor default. This is
where private investors could be integrated into the existing
performance-based debt buy-down structure. Namely, SIB in-
vestors could provide guarantees (possibly in the form of col-
lateralized standby letters of credit issued to local banks in the
host country) or other forms of financial support (possibly
even making equity investments in the entity that is to act as
the performance guarantor) to backstop the financial obliga-
tions of the performance guarantor. By eliminating the need
for long-term funding to be provided in-country by the private
investors, the foreign exchange risk of engaging in a multi-year
SIB would be diminished (thereby also reducing costs of a SIB
113. In a surety bond, the parties would include a surety agency as the
guarantor, the project owner as the obligee, and the contractor as the princi-
pal. See About Surety, THE SURETY & FIDELITY Assoc. OF AM., http://www.
surety.org/?page=AboutSurety (last visited Apr. 14, 2013); see also Edward G.
Gallagher & Mark H. McCallun, The Importance of Surety Bond Verification, 39
Pun. CONT. L.J. 269, 269-70 (2010).
114. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, LEGISlATIVE GuIDE ON PRIVATELY
FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.B/4,
U.N Sales No. E.01.V.4 (2001).
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arrangement). I Additionally, this structure, which puts its in-
vestors on the hook only for future contingent obligations,
might make it easier for these same investors to create a SIP
Guarantee that could be used to support multiple debt buy-
down arrangements, thereby also pooling risks across transac-
tions and perhaps even countries while minimizing transaction
costs of setting up a new performance guarantee vehicle for
each debt buy-down.
In a SIP Guarantee that is applied to a debt buy-down the
upfront capital needed to fund the social service providers
would continue to be provided through the proceeds of loans
extended by the World Bank or IDA to the host government.
Like a SIB structure, however, the performance guarantor
(backed by private investor/guarantors) would guarantee the
achievement of the targeted performance outcomes, thereby
shouldering the execution risk of the social service providers.
Exhibit B illustrates the basic structure of a SIP Guarantee.' 16
The SIP Guarantee needs at least two features to address
the allocation of risk and return. First, to attract a private in-
vestor/guarantor, a SIP Guarantee needs a sliding guarantee
fee that correlates positively to the successful achievement of
performance outcomes just as the financial returns paid on
the early SIB investments operate with a sliding scale of success
fees. Second, to deter the host government from interfering,
directly or indirectly, with the achievement of targeted per-
formance outcomes, SIP Guarantees should contain an ex-
press government interference "carve-out" from the guarantee
such that the private investor/guarantor could refuse to pay
115. There still would be some foreign exchange risk related to the trans-
fer risk of moving guarantee fees from the host country to the foreign inves-
tor, but there would not be any significant devaluation or depreciation risks.
116. See Exhibit B for the respective functions and roles of the actors in a
SIP Guarantee. Steps 1-4 outline in general terms the existing loan disburse-
ment process for an IDA/IBRD performance-based debt buy-down structure.
Steps 5-6 outline how funding flows if the performance targets are met.
Namely, the host government is relieved of its debt obligation to IDA/IBRD,
and the SIP Guarantors receive guarantee fees that are correlated to the
successful performance outcomes. Steps 7-8 illustrate what happens if the
performance targets are not met. In this worst-case scenario, the SIP Guaran-
tors make a guarantee payment, provided that inappropriate interference by
the host government was not the cause of the missed target. This guarantee
payment then is used by the host government to repay the IDA/IBRD loan
obligation.
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on the performance guarantee if the host government's ac-
tions (or inactions) are shown to be the proximate cause of
the failed performance outcomes.
How would this SIP Guarantee work if the targeted per-
formance outcomes were not met? As a general rule, if
targeted performance outcomes were not met, the private in-
vestor/guarantor would be called upon to pay on the perform-
ance guarantee, which would be in an amount equal to the
upfront cash funding provided by the host government to
those social service providers. The IDA or World Bank loan
would remain outstanding unless the host government was to
use the guarantee payment to reduce some or all of the debt
obligation.' 1 7 If the failure to achieve the targeted perform-
ance outcomes is due to the host government's political inter-
ference, however, then the private investor/guarantors would
have no obligation to pay the host government, and the World
Bank/IDA loan would remain outstanding.
On the other hand, if the performance outcomes are
achieved, then 1) the SIB investor/guarantors would receive a
sliding "guarantee success fee" in addition to their annual
guarantee fee from the host government, and 2) the World
Bank/IDA would buy down, using philanthropic funds, all or
117. It is likely that in this scenario the World Bank or IDA would require
all performance guarantee payments to be assigned directly to it in satisfac-
tion of the outstanding debt obligation owed by the host government.
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part of the host government's outstanding performance-based
debt obligation. "'
In sum, if structured appropriately, by integrating a SIP
Guarantee into performance-based debt buy-downs, the risks
of this financial partnership can be realigned so that private
sector investors (the private investors/guarantors) assume the
performance risk of the key private actors (in this case, the
social service providers), public investors/lenders (like the
World Bank and IDA) assume the performance and financial
risk of the key public actors (in this case, the host govern-
ment), and philanthropists pay only for those projects that de-
monstrably achieve their targeted outcomes.
V.
CONCLUSION
The excitement generated by SIBs may not be fully de-
served at this time given the very limited track record of this
social finance innovation. Yet there is much about these early
SIB structures that deserves careful attention and considera-
tion. Like the best of public/private partnerships, SIBs can
help mobilize private sources of capital to promote the effi-
cient targeting and expansion of government-contracted social
services. Moreover, given current financial constraints on host
governments and donor assistance organizations, SIBs offer an
opportunity to attract private sector investors to help fund so-
lutions to some of the world's most pressing problems. But tak-
ing SIBs to the countries where they could be most useful will
not be easy, particularly if those countries suffer from weak
governance structures and leadership. Accordingly, new SIB
structures and new SIB actors will need to be introduced. Cre-
ative arrangements for sharing SIB risks and returns will need
to be negotiated. Thoughtful assessments of costs and benefits
of proceeding with SIB or SIB-like structures will need to be
undertaken. Of equal importance, thought should be given to
how these SIB variations are sequenced in a given country so
118. Presumably the guarantee fees payable by the host government
would be much less, even after taking into account guarantee success fees,
than the outstanding debt obligation to be retired by IDA and the World
Bank as part of the debt buy-down. This debt relief then should free up
additional resources that can be used by the host government to make its
SIB guarantee payments.
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that host governments are able, over time, to build a track re-
cord of success that demonstrates their capacity and willing-
ness to be a successful SIB partner.
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